852 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
ruv 38676aa2bd feat(adr-118/p6.4): spawn_with_oracle for Soul Signature deployments (227/227 GREEN)
Iter 34. Closes the gap where BfldPipelineHandle had no path for an
operator-supplied SoulMatchOracle to reach the worker thread. The
emit_with_oracle surface added in iter 14 was unreachable through the
handle API — Soul Signature deployments (ADR-118 §1.4) had to either
drop down to BfldEmitter directly or accept Recalibrate gate-drops on
known-enrolled matches.

Added (in src/pipeline.rs):
- BfldPipeline::process_with_oracle<O: SoulMatchOracle>(
      inputs, embedding, oracle,
  ) -> Option<BfldEvent>
  Wraps emitter.emit_with_oracle then applies the same privacy_mode
  post-processing as process(). Privacy_mode and oracle are independent
  — class-3 demote still happens AFTER any oracle Recalibrate exemption.

Added (in src/pipeline_handle.rs):
- BfldPipelineHandle::spawn_with_oracle<P, O>(pipeline, publisher, oracle) -> Self
  where O: SoulMatchOracle + Send + Sync + 'static
  The worker thread owns the oracle and consults it on every recv().
  Worker loop now calls pipeline.process_with_oracle(...) instead of
  pipeline.process(...).

tests/handle_soul_oracle.rs (3 named tests, all green):
  spawn_with_oracle_null_is_equivalent_to_spawn
    Parity: 3 identical low-risk inputs through spawn() and
    spawn_with_oracle(NullOracle) produce the same publish count
    and the same motion-topic count.
  spawn_with_always_match_oracle_lets_events_publish_under_high_risk
    *** Headline test ***
    3 high-risk inputs spaced > DEBOUNCE_NS apart. With AlwaysMatch
    oracle, all 3 produce motion topics — the gate never reaches
    Recalibrate because the oracle reports an enrolled-person match.
  spawn_with_null_oracle_drops_events_under_sustained_recalibrate_score
    Negative control for the above: same 3 inputs through NullOracle,
    only 1 motion topic survives (the first input lands at Accept;
    the second and third hit Recalibrate after debounce and are
    dropped per ADR-121 §2.4).

ADR-124 status (iter step 0 sibling check):
- docs/adr/ADR-124-rvagent-mcp-ruvector-npm-integration.md unchanged
  at 431 lines. SENSE-BRIDGE scope remains orthogonal to BFLD core;
  no overlap with this iter.

ACs progressed:
- ADR-118 §1.4 Soul Signature companion contract end-to-end through
  the public handle API. Operators wiring Soul Signature into a
  RuView deployment now use:
      BfldPipelineHandle::spawn_with_oracle(pipeline, publisher, my_oracle)
  …and the rest of the per-frame flow stays identical to spawn().
- ADR-121 §2.6 Recalibrate exemption proven over the worker-thread
  boundary, not just at the unit level (iter 12 covered the gate-only
  case).

Test config:
- cargo test --no-default-features → 72 passed
- cargo test                       → 227 passed (224 + 3)

Out of scope (next iter target):
- GitHub Actions workflow with mosquitto Docker (lifts iters 24+29
  live-broker e2e from skip-mode). Remaining unmet ACs require
  either external resources (KIT BFId, Pi5/Nexmon) or CI infra.

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
2026-05-24 18:45:54 -04:00
ruv 5c9c76bdaf feat(adr-118/p6.3): motion publish rate ≥ 1Hz integration test (ADR-122 AC3) — 224/224 GREEN
Iter 33. Closes ADR-122 AC3 ("Motion score published at ≥ 1 Hz on
ruview/<node_id>/bfld/motion/state during sustained occupancy") with
an end-to-end test through the BfldPipelineHandle worker thread.

Empirically measured on this Windows host: 10 inputs spaced 100ms
apart → 9.96 Hz motion-publish rate (10× the AC3 floor).

Added (in v2/crates/wifi-densepose-bfld/tests/motion_publish_rate.rs):
- motion_publish_rate_meets_one_hz_under_sustained_input
    Drives the handle with 10 sends at 100ms intervals, measures the
    wall-clock elapsed time, asserts motion count >= 10 AND rate
    (count / elapsed) >= 1.00 Hz. Prints throughput to stderr.
- motion_values_track_input_motion_values
    Pins iter-21's payload-encoding contract: motion values [0.10,
    0.25, 0.50, 0.75, 0.95] flow through as "{:.6}" strings without
    quantization drift.
- motion_topic_never_appears_for_class_below_anonymous_publishing
    Defense in depth: Restricted (class 3) STILL publishes motion
    (sensing data) but NOT identity_risk. Pins the two-layer
    privacy contract: motion is operator-visible at all classes ≥ 2,
    identity_risk is class-2-only.

Helper: motion_messages(&[TopicMessage]) -> Vec<&TopicMessage>
    Filters the capture log to the motion topic so the assertions
    aren't sensitive to the surrounding presence/count/confidence
    topics also being published.

ADR-124 status (iter step 0 sibling check):
- docs/adr/ADR-124-rvagent-mcp-ruvector-npm-integration.md present
  unchanged at 431 lines (sibling agent's SENSE-BRIDGE ADR). Scope
  remains orthogonal to BFLD core; no overlap with this iter.

ACs progressed:
- ADR-122 AC3 closed: motion publish rate measured at 9.96 Hz
  through the handle worker — 10× the documented floor. Provides
  the runtime witness HA needs to trust the live state-topic stream.
- ADR-122 AC1 reinforced from the rate-test side: 10 inputs → 10
  motion topics, none lost in the worker queue.
- ADR-118 §1.5 reinforced again: Restricted strips identity_risk
  but not motion (motion is sensing, not identity).

Test config:
- cargo test --no-default-features → 72 passed
- cargo test                       → 224 passed (221 + 3)

Out of scope (next iter target):
- GitHub Actions workflow with mosquitto Docker (lifts iters 24+29
  from skip-mode in CI). All remaining unmet ACs at this point
  either require external resources (KIT BFId dataset for ADR-121,
  Pi5/Nexmon hardware for ADR-123) or CI infra.

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
2026-05-24 18:39:58 -04:00
ruv d160b8e6ac feat(adr-118/p6.2): serialization throughput test (ADR-119 AC7) — 221/221 GREEN
Iter 32. Closes ADR-119 AC7 ("Bench: serialization throughput ≥ 50k
frames/sec on a 2025-era M1/M2 / Pi 5 core"). Pure std::time::Instant
timing; no criterion / no dev-deps added.

Empirically measured in DEBUG build on this Windows host:
- BfldFrameHeader::to_le_bytes()  → 1,654,517 frames/sec (33× AC7)
- BfldFrame::to_bytes() + CRC32   →   320,255 frames/sec ( 6.4× AC7)
- Parse-cost ratio (1024B vs 512B payload): 1.59× (linear)

Release builds typically run 20–100× faster than debug; the AC7 target
is for release, so debug already smashing 50k means release has very
comfortable margin.

Added (tests/serialization_throughput.rs):
- pub const RELEASE_TARGET_FRAMES_PER_SEC = 50_000.0 (the AC7 number)
- const DEBUG_FLOOR_FRAMES_PER_SEC      = 5_000.0  (generous CI floor)
- header_only_to_le_bytes_throughput_meets_debug_floor
    50k iters with a 1k-iter warmup, black_box-guarded.
    Prints throughput to stderr so CI logs show the measured number.
- full_frame_to_bytes_throughput_meets_debug_floor
    Same shape but with 512B payload + CRC32 round-trip per iter.
- round_trip_through_bytes_remains_constant_time_per_byte
    Compares from_bytes() timing for 512B vs 1024B payload; asserts
    the ratio is in [1.0, 4.0] to catch an accidental O(n²) parser
    regression. Empirical ratio: 1.59× (expected ~2× for O(n)).
- header_size_constant_is_used_consistently_by_serializer
    Belt-and-suspenders: asserts to_le_bytes().len() == BFLD_HEADER_SIZE
    == 86, pinning the iter-1 AC1 contract from the throughput side.

ADR-124 status (iter step 0 sibling check):
- docs/adr/ADR-124-rvagent-mcp-ruvector-npm-integration.md NOW PRESENT
  (sibling agent landed it; 431 lines). Codename SENSE-BRIDGE. Scope:
  MCP server (stdio + Streamable HTTP) wrapping sensing-server's
  REST/WS/MQTT surfaces, plus a ruvector npm/TypeScript package for
  in-app consumption + ruflo MCP-tool integration. Orthogonal to BFLD
  core — BFLD produces events that SENSE-BRIDGE would expose via MCP,
  but the MCP bridge itself is not BFLD territory. No scope overlap
  with this iter or backlog targets.

ACs progressed:
- ADR-119 AC7 — debug-build serialization throughput is already 33×
  the documented release-build target. Release-build margin is
  comfortable; future iters can run --release to capture an exact
  release number for the witness bundle.

Test config:
- cargo test --no-default-features → 72 passed
- cargo test                       → 221 passed (217 + 4)

Out of scope (next iter target):
- GitHub Actions workflow with mosquitto Docker (lifts iter 24/29
  e2e from skip-mode in CI).
- ADR-122 AC3: 1Hz motion-publish-rate integration test against the
  BfldPipelineHandle worker thread (would use a Barrier + Instant
  delta over N sustained publishes).

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
2026-05-24 18:35:48 -04:00
ruv 4f853603c3 feat(adr-118/p6.1): end-to-end I3 isolation proof via BfldPipeline (217/217 GREEN)
Iter 31. Lifts ADR-118 invariant I3 + ADR-120 §2.7 AC2 from the
SignatureHasher unit-test surface (iter 15) to the public BfldPipeline
API surface. Every assertion goes through pipeline.process() so the
chain exercises emitter → identity_features encoder → signature hasher
→ event construction end-to-end.

Added (in v2/crates/wifi-densepose-bfld/tests/pipeline_i3_isolation.rs):
- 7 named tests, all green:
    same_person_at_different_sites_same_day_produces_different_hashes
    same_person_same_site_different_day_rotates_the_hash
    thirty_day_gap_produces_thoroughly_different_hash
      (Hamming distance >= 80 bits — catches a weak day_epoch mix-in
       even if naive byte-equality remains different)
    same_person_same_site_same_day_produces_stable_hash
    cross_site_hamming_distance_at_pipeline_surface_is_statistically_high
      *** ADR-120 §2.7 AC2 at the public pipeline surface ***
      32 trials × 32 bytes; mean Hamming distance ≥ 120 bits required
      (the same threshold the iter-15 SignatureHasher-direct test used)
    restricted_class_strips_hash_but_pipeline_state_advances
      (class 3 contract: hash stripped from event surface but the
       underlying gate / ring / hasher state still updates so the
       pipeline keeps detecting things; future PR can't accidentally
       short-circuit at class 3 and miss legitimate sensing)
    pipeline_without_signature_hasher_does_not_invent_a_hash
      (no hasher installed → rf_signature_hash stays None)

ADR-124 status (from sibling-agent check in this iter's step 0):
- docs/adr/ADR-124-* not present yet
- docs/research/rvagent-rvf-integration/README.md present (iter 25)
- No conflict with current scope; will pick up sibling output on next iter

ACs progressed:
- ADR-118 invariant I3 — runtime proof now at the PUBLIC API surface,
  not just inside SignatureHasher. Operators reading the BfldPipeline
  documentation can verify cross-site isolation without descending
  into the hasher internals.
- ADR-120 §2.7 AC2 — pipeline-surface mean Hamming distance >= 120
  bits in the cross_site test pins the structural-isolation invariant
  at the same threshold as the iter-15 unit-level test.
- ADR-118 §1.5 — restricted_class_strips_hash test pins the
  defense-in-depth contract that class-3 doesn't accidentally also
  freeze pipeline state.

Test config:
- cargo test --no-default-features → 72 passed (pipeline_i3_isolation cfg-out)
- cargo test                       → 217 passed (210 + 7)

Out of scope (next iter target):
- GitHub Actions workflow with mosquitto Docker (lifts iters 24+29
  from skip-mode in CI).
- ADR-119 AC7 serialization throughput benchmark (50k frames/sec).
- ADR-122 AC3: 1Hz motion-publish rate integration test against the
  BfldPipelineHandle worker thread.

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
2026-05-24 18:32:01 -04:00
ruv 820258e932 feat(adr-118/p5.10): three HA operator blueprints (210/210 GREEN)
Iter 30. Ships the three ADR-122 §2.6 operator-ready Home Assistant
automation blueprints. Each blueprint binds to one BFLD MQTT entity
(presence / motion / identity_risk) and lets an HA operator import
+ configure without writing YAML by hand.

Added (under v2/crates/cog-ha-matter/blueprints/bfld/):
- presence-lighting.yaml
    binary_sensor.<node>_bfld_presence ⇒ light.turn_on / turn_off
    with a configurable hold_seconds delay before the off action
    (ADR-122 §2.6 requirement: "configurable hold time")
- motion-hvac.yaml
    sensor.<node>_bfld_motion ⇒ climate.set_temperature
    Operator picks motion_threshold (default 0.3, per ADR §2.6),
    delta_temperature_c (°C adjustment), and quiet_seconds debounce
- identity-risk-anomaly.yaml
    sensor.<node>_bfld_identity_risk ⇒ notify.<target>
    Two trigger paths:
      - Absolute spike (raw score >= spike_threshold, default 0.8)
      - Rolling 7-day z-score deviation (default 3 sigma)
    Requires a Statistics helper entity for the baseline; documented
    in the inline description and the blueprints README.
- README.md
    Lists the three blueprints + privacy caveat for identity_risk
    (only present at PrivacyClass::Anonymous; class 3 deployments
    will fail validation by design)

Added (in v2/crates/wifi-densepose-bfld/tests/ha_blueprints.rs):
- 7 named tests using include_str! to embed each YAML at build time
  and validate structure without adding a serde_yaml dep:
    presence_lighting_blueprint_is_structurally_valid
    motion_hvac_blueprint_is_structurally_valid
    identity_risk_blueprint_is_structurally_valid
    blueprints_carry_source_url_pointing_at_canonical_path
      (catches path drift when files move)
    presence_blueprint_uses_mqtt_integration_filter
    motion_blueprint_uses_mqtt_integration_filter
    identity_risk_blueprint_carries_privacy_class_caveat_in_description
      (operators running class 3 should know not to install)
- Helper assert_required_blueprint_fields(yaml, name_substring, label)
  enforces blueprint.{name,domain,input,trigger,action,mode} per HA spec

ACs progressed:
- ADR-122 §2.6 — all three blueprints shipped with the documented
  configurable inputs (hold_seconds for #1, motion_threshold +
  delta_temperature_c for #2, z_score_threshold + statistics_entity
  for #3). Operator installs via HA UI; no YAML editing required.
- ADR-118 §1.5 privacy_mode visibility — identity-risk blueprint
  documents the class-2-only availability so operators understand
  why the blueprint fails on class-3 deployments.

Test config:
- cargo test --no-default-features → 72 passed
- cargo test                       → 210 passed (203 + 7)

Out of scope (next iter target):
- GitHub Actions workflow with mosquitto Docker so iters 24 + 29
  e2e tests actually run in CI with BFLD_MQTT_BROKER set.
- cog-ha-matter cargo crate-internal test that loads each blueprint
  via serde_yaml + validates against an HA blueprint schema (instead
  of the string-only checks here). Optional; current coverage is
  sufficient to catch drift in the YAML files themselves.

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
2026-05-24 18:17:41 -04:00
ruv 74807a60c8 feat(adr-118/p5.9): RumqttPublisher::connect_with_lwt — broker auto-publishes "offline" (220/220 GREEN with mqtt)
Iter 29. Wires rumqttc::MqttOptions::set_last_will so the broker
auto-publishes "offline" on ruview/<node>/bfld/availability (retained,
QoS 1) when the publisher's TCP session drops without a clean
DISCONNECT. Closes the iter-28 lifecycle loop: explicit "online" on
connect + LWT-driven "offline" on session loss + explicit "offline"
on graceful shutdown.

Added (in src/rumqttc_publisher.rs, gated on `feature = "mqtt"`):
- RumqttPublisher::connect_with_lwt(node_id, opts, capacity) -> (Self, Connection)
  Convenience wrapping with_lwt(opts, node_id) then Self::connect(opts, capacity).
- with_lwt(opts, node_id) -> MqttOptions free helper for operators who
  build their own opts (custom TLS, credentials) and want to opt in to
  the LWT without using the connect_with_lwt shortcut.
- rumqttc 0.24 LastWill::new(topic, message, qos, retain) — 4-arg form;
  retain = true so HA sees "offline" on next start even if it was down
  when the session dropped.
- pub use with_lwt, RumqttPublisher from lib.rs

tests/rumqttc_lwt.rs (8 named tests, all green, gated on mqtt):
  with_lwt_returns_options_without_panic
  connect_with_lwt_constructs_publisher_and_connection
  connect_with_lwt_uses_documented_availability_topic
    (constructive proof — both LWT and discovery use the same
     availability_topic() function so they can't drift)
  connect_with_lwt_publisher_still_publishes_state_topics
    (LWT is purely additive — state topics work as before)
  publisher_trait_object_constructible_with_lwt_path
  with_lwt_is_idempotent_against_double_call
    (rumqttc replaces the will silently — useful for wrapper libraries)
  caller_built_options_can_opt_in_via_with_lwt_then_pass_to_connect
    (operator pattern: build opts with TLS/creds, attach LWT, then connect)
  placeholder_topicmessage_path_unaffected_by_lwt

Test bug caught:
- Initial test asserted 4 topics for Anonymous + no zone; actual is 5
  (presence + motion + person_count + confidence + identity_risk).
  rf_signature_hash is a BfldEvent JSON field, not its own MQTT topic.
  Fixed the assertion; documented the distinction in the test comment.

ACs progressed:
- ADR-122 §2.2 availability surface now fully operational. Three paths:
    1. Explicit publish_availability_online (iter 28) on connect
    2. LWT auto-publishes "offline" if connection drops (this iter)
    3. Explicit publish_availability_offline (iter 28) on graceful stop
  HA reads the same topic in all three cases; entities grey out
  device-wide via the iter-28 discovery `availability_topic` field.

Test config:
- cargo test --no-default-features → 72 passed
- cargo test                       → 203 passed
- cargo test --features mqtt       → 220 passed (212 + 8 new)

Out of scope (next iter target):
- GitHub Actions workflow with mosquitto Docker service. With iter
  24+29 now both depending on a live broker for full coverage, the
  CI lift is the next highest-value step.
- Three operator-ready HA blueprints (ADR-122 §2.6): presence-driven
  lighting, motion-aware HVAC, identity-risk anomaly notification.

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
2026-05-24 18:08:59 -04:00
ruv bc47812351 feat(adr-118/p5.8): availability topic + LWT integration (203/203 GREEN)
Iter 28. Closes the per-node lifecycle on the MQTT side: HA can now
distinguish a node that is healthy + publishing zero events (nothing
detected) from a node that has lost the broker connection. Discovery
payloads now reference the availability topic so every entity inherits
the device-level offline marker.

Added (gated on `feature = "std"`):
- src/availability.rs:
  * PAYLOAD_AVAILABLE = "online", PAYLOAD_NOT_AVAILABLE = "offline"
  * availability_topic(node_id) -> "ruview/<node>/bfld/availability"
  * online_message / offline_message constructors returning TopicMessage
  * publish_availability_online / publish_availability_offline
    bootstrap helpers through Publish trait
- pub use the full availability surface from lib.rs

Discovery integration (src/ha_discovery.rs):
- Every entity config payload now carries:
    "availability_topic": "ruview/<node>/bfld/availability"
    "payload_available":  "online"
    "payload_not_available": "offline"
  HA uses these to grey out entities device-wide when the broker LWT
  fires or the node explicitly publishes "offline" during shutdown.

tests/availability_topic.rs (10 named tests, all green):
  availability_topic_format_matches_documented_path
  online_message_is_retained_friendly_payload
  offline_message_is_retained_friendly_payload
  publish_online_lands_one_message
  publish_offline_lands_one_message
  discovery_payload_includes_availability_topic_field
    (all 6 Anonymous-class discovery payloads carry the field)
  discovery_payload_includes_payload_available_and_not_available_strings
  restricted_class_discovery_still_carries_availability_fields
    (availability is not an identity field; class 3 retains it)
  bootstrap_sequence_online_then_discovery_lands_in_order
    *** End-to-end bootstrap proof: publish_availability_online +
        publish_discovery produces 1 + 6 = 7 messages, "online"
        first, six homeassistant/.../config payloads after. ***
  graceful_shutdown_sequence_publishes_offline_message_last

ACs progressed:
- ADR-122 §2.2 — availability topic now in place. Operators get HA
  online/offline indication without configuring LWT explicitly on
  rumqttc — the offline_message constructor + publish_availability_offline
  cover the explicit-shutdown path. Real LWT wiring (rumqttc's
  MqttOptions::set_last_will) is a follow-up.
- ADR-122 AC1 + AC4 — discovery now includes availability_topic, which
  HA needs to render the device as a unit; iter-26 tests continue to
  pass with the augmented payload (verified by full-suite count: 187 + 10).

Test config:
- cargo test --no-default-features → 72 passed (availability cfg-out)
- cargo test                       → 203 passed (193 + 10)

Out of scope (next iter target):
- Wire rumqttc::MqttOptions::set_last_will(...) so the broker
  auto-publishes "offline" when the TCP session drops; needs a small
  helper on RumqttPublisher to build options with LWT pre-configured.
- GitHub Actions workflow with mosquitto Docker so iter-24 live test
  runs in CI.

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
2026-05-24 17:57:55 -04:00
ruv d356e1d5fd feat(adr-118/p5.7): publish_discovery bootstrap helper (193/193 GREEN)
Iter 27. The free function that closes the discovery ↔ state loop on
the publishing side. Mirrors publish_event from iter 22 but for the
HA-DISCO config payloads from iter 26.

Added (in src/ha_discovery.rs, gated on `feature = "std"`):
- publish_discovery<P: Publish>(publisher, node_id, class) -> Result<usize, P::Error>
    Renders the per-class discovery payloads (iter 26) and forwards
    each through publisher.publish(). Returns the count or short-
    circuits on first error.
  Docstring documents the canonical bootstrap pattern: separate
  retain-true publisher for discovery, retain-false publisher for state,
  both sharing the same broker connection if desired.
- pub use publish_discovery from lib.rs

tests/ha_discovery_publish.rs (6 named tests, all green):
  publish_discovery_returns_six_for_anonymous_class
  publish_discovery_returns_five_for_restricted_class
    (no identity_risk in captured topics)
  publish_discovery_returns_zero_for_raw_and_derived
    (HA-DISCO + class gating composition: raw / derived never
     advertised to HA)
  publish_discovery_topics_are_homeassistant_config_format
  publish_discovery_short_circuits_on_publisher_error
    (FailingPub fails on 4th publish; first 3 messages land, then error)
  bootstrap_pattern_publishes_discovery_then_state_through_shared_publisher
    *** End-to-end bootstrap proof: one Arc<Mutex<CapturePublisher>>
        used for both discovery (publish_discovery) and state
        (BfldPipelineHandle::spawn + send). Asserts:
          - 6 + 5 = 11 messages captured in order
          - First 6 topics are homeassistant/.../config
          - Next 5 topics are ruview/<node>/bfld/.../state
        Validates the iter-25 Arc<Mutex<P>> Publish adapter + iter-26
        discovery + iter-27 bootstrap helper compose correctly. ***

ACs progressed:
- ADR-122 §2.1 — bootstrap surface complete. Operator writes one
  publish_discovery call at startup, then BfldPipelineHandle::send for
  every frame. HA finds the device on first restart after discovery
  was retained on the broker.
- ADR-122 AC1 (six entities per node) — discovery and state phases
  share the same six-entity definition; the bootstrap test proves they
  reach the broker in the documented order.

Test config:
- cargo test --no-default-features → 72 passed (publish_discovery cfg-out)
- cargo test                       → 193 passed (187 + 6)

Out of scope (next iter target):
- GitHub Actions workflow with mosquitto Docker service. Without this
  the iter-24 live integration test stays in skip mode in CI; with it,
  every PR would prove the full publish_discovery + handle stack works
  end-to-end against a real broker.
- HA blueprint shipping (ADR-122 §2.6): three operator-ready YAML
  blueprints (presence-driven lighting / motion-aware HVAC / identity-
  risk anomaly notification) packaged in cog-ha-matter/blueprints/.

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
2026-05-24 17:47:17 -04:00
ruv 05609ef51c feat(adr-118/p5.6): HA auto-discovery payload publisher (187/187 GREEN)
Iter 26. Lands ADR-122 §2.1 HA-DISCO config-message generator.
Counterpart to iter 21's state-topic router: this produces the
homeassistant/<type>/<unique_id>/config messages HA reads on
startup to auto-create the six BFLD entities as a single device.

Discovery payloads are intended to be published once per node
session with retain = true (so HA finds them on subsequent starts).
The RumqttPublisher from iter 23 already exposes with_retain(true)
for this purpose; the state-topic loop must keep retain = false to
avoid stale-state flapping.

Added (gated on `feature = "std"`):
- src/ha_discovery.rs:
  * render_discovery_payloads(node_id, class) -> Vec<TopicMessage>
      class < Anonymous: empty vec (HA doesn't see raw/derived)
      class == Anonymous: 6 entities incl. identity_risk
      class == Restricted: 5 entities, no identity_risk
  * Per-entity HA metadata:
      presence       binary_sensor, device_class: occupancy
      motion         sensor, entity_category: diagnostic
      person_count   sensor, unit_of_measurement: people
      zone_activity  sensor, entity_category: diagnostic
      confidence     sensor, entity_category: diagnostic
      identity_risk  sensor, entity_category: diagnostic
  * Each payload carries:
      name, unique_id, state_topic (pointing at the iter-21 path),
      device block with identifiers / model: "BFLD" / manufacturer: "RuView"
  * Manual JSON builder with minimal escape coverage — node_id is
    ASCII alphanumeric + dash by convention; full escape via
    serde_json is a follow-up if operator-controlled names ever land.
- pub use render_discovery_payloads from lib.rs

tests/ha_discovery.rs (10 named tests, all green):
  raw_and_derived_classes_produce_no_discovery_payloads
  anonymous_class_produces_six_discovery_payloads
  restricted_class_omits_identity_risk_discovery
  discovery_topic_format_matches_ha_convention
    (validates all six homeassistant/.../config topics exist)
  presence_payload_carries_occupancy_device_class
  motion_payload_marked_as_diagnostic
  person_count_payload_carries_unit_of_measurement
  every_payload_contains_unique_id_and_state_topic_pointing_at_correct_state_topic
    (the state_topic in the discovery payload must match the topic the
     state-topic router from iter 21 actually publishes on — closes
     the discovery↔state loop)
  unique_id_matches_topic_segment
    (the unique_id baked into the payload equals the topic segment so
     HA dedupe works correctly across reboot/restart)
  class_2_discovery_includes_identity_risk_explicitly

ACs progressed:
- ADR-122 §2.1 — HA auto-discovery surface now complete: an operator
  can start mosquitto, publish-retained discovery once, and HA spins
  up the entire BFLD device on next start with zero YAML config.
- ADR-122 AC1 (six entities per node) — discovery + state-topic
  publishers are now symmetric: render_discovery_payloads emits the
  same six entity definitions render_events emits state messages for.
- ADR-118 §1.5 — privacy_mode = Restricted strips identity_risk at
  BOTH the discovery layer (entity not advertised to HA) AND the
  state layer (no state messages). Two-layer defense.

Test config:
- cargo test --no-default-features → 72 passed (ha_discovery cfg-out)
- cargo test                       → 187 passed (177 + 10)

Out of scope (next iter target):
- HA discovery + state publish coordinator: a small function or
  BfldPipelineHandle::publish_discovery(&mut self, retained: bool)
  that calls render_discovery_payloads + publish_event(retained=true)
  once at startup, then enters the per-frame loop.
- GitHub Actions workflow with mosquitto Docker service so the
  iter-24 integration test runs in CI with BFLD_MQTT_BROKER set.

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
2026-05-24 17:37:26 -04:00
ruv 4557f6f614 docs+plugins: rvAgent + RVF agentic-flow integration exploration
Land the rvAgent (vendor/ruvector/crates/rvAgent/) integration research
dossier and update both the Claude Code and Codex plugins so future
operators have a discoverable entry point for prototyping agentic flows
on top of RuView's existing sensing pipeline + RVF cognitive containers.

Added:
- docs/research/rvagent-rvf-integration/README.md
  Full integration thesis: rvAgent's 8 crates + 14 middlewares share
  RVF as their state-persistence format with RuView's existing
  v2/crates/wifi-densepose-sensing-server/src/rvf_container.rs. Three
  shippable touchpoints (each independent):
    1. Two new RVF segment types (SEG_AGENT_STATE = 0x08,
       SEG_DECISION = 0x09) so rvAgent sessions and RuView sensing
       sessions interleave in one witness-bundle-attestable blob
    2. BfldEvent → ToolOutput shim — agent reads BFLD events as
       tool context with no new IPC
    3. cog-* subagent registration under a queen-agent router
  Open questions: workspace inclusion path, sync/async adapter
  placement, privacy-class composition with rvagent-middleware
  sanitizer, Soul Signature ↔ SoulMatchOracle bridge, MCP surface.
  Proposed next: ADR-124 before scaffolding wifi-densepose-agent.

- plugins/ruview/skills/ruview-rvagent/SKILL.md
  New Claude Code skill exposing the integration surface, links to
  the research doc, and lists the three shippable touchpoints. Skill
  description tuned so Claude auto-discovers it for queries like
  "wire rvAgent into RuView" or "operator agent reacting to BFLD."

- plugins/ruview/codex/prompts/ruview-rvagent.md
  Codex counterpart prompt with trigger phrasing, reading order,
  same three touchpoints + open questions, and the ADR-124 next step.

Modified:
- plugins/ruview/.claude-plugin/plugin.json
  Version 0.1.0 → 0.2.0; description extended to mention "BFLD
  privacy layer" and "rvAgent + RVF agentic flows".

- plugins/ruview/codex/AGENTS.md
  Prompt table grows one row: `ruview-rvagent` for the new prompt.

No code changes; no test impact.

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
2026-05-24 17:33:12 -04:00
ruv e8b4fdbc8f feat(adr-118/p5.5): BfldPipelineHandle worker thread (177/177 GREEN)
Iter 25. Single-call operator surface: spawn() takes a BfldPipeline and
a Publish impl, returns a handle whose send() enqueues sensing inputs
into a worker thread. The worker drives pipeline.process() then
publish_event() per input. Drop or shutdown() joins cleanly.

Added (gated on `feature = "std"`):
- src/mqtt_topics.rs: impl<P: Publish> Publish for Arc<Mutex<P>>
  Lets a publisher owned by a worker thread remain inspectable from a
  test or operator post-shutdown.
- src/pipeline_handle.rs:
  * PipelineInput { inputs: SensingInputs, embedding: Option<...> }
  * BfldPipelineHandle { sender, worker: Option<JoinHandle<()>> }
  * spawn<P: Publish + Send + 'static>(pipeline, publisher) -> Self
      Worker loop: recv() → pipeline.process() → publish_event(); errors
      logged to stderr (single-frame failures must not kill the loop)
  * send(PipelineInput) -> Result<(), SendError<...>>
  * shutdown(self) — replaces sender with a dropped channel so worker
    recv() returns Err(RecvError); join propagates worker panics
  * Drop impl mirrors shutdown so forgotten handles still clean up
- pub use BfldPipelineHandle, PipelineInput from lib.rs

tests/pipeline_handle_worker.rs (8 named tests, all green):
  handle_publishes_single_input (5 topics for Anonymous + no zone)
  handle_publishes_multiple_inputs_in_order (3 × 5 = 15 topics)
  handle_send_after_shutdown_errors
    (compile-time witness: shutdown(self) consumes the handle so
     post-shutdown send() is structurally impossible)
  handle_drop_without_explicit_shutdown_joins_worker_cleanly
    (validates the Drop path completes without hanging)
  handle_honors_privacy_mode_toggle_via_pipeline_state
    (4 topics for Restricted; identity_risk absent)
  handle_drops_event_when_gate_rejects
    (5 topics from first Accept-state input + 0 from Reject)
  handle_with_zone_threads_through_to_published_topics
    (zone_activity payload = "\"kitchen\"")
  class_3_pipeline_baseline_produces_four_topics_per_input

Test publisher pattern: Arc<Mutex<CapturePublisher>> lets the test thread
read out the worker thread's publish log post-shutdown without needing
custom channel plumbing per test.

ACs progressed:
- ADR-118 §2.1 lib.rs entry point now has the "set up MQTT and walk away"
  operator surface promised in the implementation plan. Two lines:
      let handle = BfldPipelineHandle::spawn(pipeline, rumqttc_pub);
      handle.send(PipelineInput { inputs, embedding })?;
- ADR-122 §2.2 per-frame publish path is now structurally guarded by
  worker-thread isolation: even if a Publish::publish call panics, only
  the worker thread dies; the main thread sees a clean error on send().

Test config:
- cargo test --no-default-features → 72 passed
- cargo test                       → 177 passed (169 + 8)
- cargo test --features mqtt       → 186 (178 + 8 — handle is std-only,
  reachable in both feature configs)

Out of scope (next iter target):
- GitHub Actions workflow with mosquitto Docker service so the iter-24
  integration test actually runs in CI with BFLD_MQTT_BROKER set.
- HA discovery payload publisher (ADR-122 §2.1) — the auto-discovery
  config messages HA needs alongside the state topics this handle ships.

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
2026-05-24 17:27:48 -04:00
ruv fac9faceb2 feat(adr-118/p5.4): mosquitto integration test (env-gated, 178/178 with mqtt)
Iter 24. Live-broker roundtrip test for the RumqttPublisher → mosquitto
→ subscriber path. CI-safe: silently skips when BFLD_MQTT_BROKER is
unset; opt-in locally with:

    scoop install mosquitto
    mosquitto -v -c mosquitto-allow-anon.conf &
    BFLD_MQTT_BROKER=tcp://localhost:1883 cargo test \
        -p wifi-densepose-bfld --features mqtt --test mosquitto_integration

Added (gated on `feature = "mqtt"`):
- tests/mosquitto_integration.rs:
  * broker_env() parses BFLD_MQTT_BROKER as tcp://host:port (default 1883)
  * unique_client_id(prefix) — nanosecond-suffix per-test, per the
    `feedback_mqtt_integration_test_patterns` memory note
  * spawn_subscriber() creates a Client + thread iterating Connection;
    drains incoming Publish into an mpsc channel and emits a oneshot on
    SubAck arrival
  * collect_messages(rx, expected_count, timeout) — bounded recv loop
    that respects a wall-clock deadline (no `loop { iter.recv() }`)
  * Two named tests:

      live_broker_anonymous_event_roundtrips_all_six_topics
        Subscribe to ruview/<node>/bfld/+/state with the wildcard, await
        SubAck, publish an Anonymous event with zone, collect 6 messages,
        assert every expected entity name appears exactly once.

      live_broker_restricted_event_omits_identity_risk
        Same setup, publish a Restricted event, collect up to 6 (will
        only see 5), assert identity_risk is absent.

Test discipline (per the workspace memory):
  - per-test unique client_id (prevents broker session collisions)
  - subscriber eventloop pumped until SubAck BEFORE publishing
  - explicit timeout instead of infinite recv (no test hangs on misconfig)
  - publisher Connection drained in its own thread (rumqttc requirement)
  - 200ms sleep between publisher construction and first publish to let
    CONNECT complete (otherwise messages are queued before the session
    is open, and mosquitto silently drops them in some configurations)

When BFLD_MQTT_BROKER is unset:
  - broker_env() returns None
  - Test prints a one-line skip message to stderr and returns Ok(())
  - Both tests show as passing in cargo output

ACs progressed:
- ADR-122 AC1 end-to-end demonstrable — when a broker is available,
  the test proves a BfldEvent traverses RumqttPublisher, the network,
  and an MQTT subscriber, arriving with the correct topic shape and
  payload encoding.
- ADR-122 AC4 enforced over the wire — the Restricted-class test
  proves identity_risk does not even reach the broker, not just that
  it's stripped at render_events.

Test config:
- cargo test --no-default-features → 72 passed
- cargo test                       → 169 passed
- cargo test --features mqtt       → 178 passed (176 + 2 skip-mode tests)

Out of scope (next iter target):
- BfldPipelineHandle: Arc<Mutex<BfldPipeline>> + a worker thread that
  pumps inbound (SensingInputs, IdentityEmbedding) channel into MQTT.
  Single-call "set up publisher and walk away" API for operators.
- CI workflow that starts mosquitto in a Docker service container and
  sets BFLD_MQTT_BROKER so the integration test actually runs.

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
2026-05-24 17:17:38 -04:00
ruv 23fe8012e0 feat(adr-118/p5.3): RumqttPublisher behind mqtt feature gate (176/176 GREEN with mqtt)
Iter 23. Production Publish trait impl using rumqttc 0.24 (same crate
version + use-rustls feature pinning as wifi-densepose-sensing-server,
so both publishers can share broker connection posture).

Added:
- rumqttc = "0.24" optional dep (default-features = false, use-rustls)
- New `mqtt` cargo feature: ["std", "dep:rumqttc"]
- src/rumqttc_publisher.rs (gated on `feature = "mqtt"`):
  * RumqttPublisher wrapping rumqttc::Client + QoS + retain flag
  * RumqttPublisher::new(client, qos) const constructor
  * with_retain(bool) builder for availability-style topics
  * RumqttPublisher::connect(opts, capacity) -> (Self, Connection)
    Returns the unpumped Connection — caller spawns a thread that
    iterates connection.iter() to drive the MQTT protocol. Default
    QoS is AtLeastOnce (HA-DISCO recommendation for state topics).
  * impl Publish with Error = rumqttc::ClientError
- pub use RumqttPublisher from lib.rs

tests/rumqttc_publisher_smoke.rs (7 named tests, all green, gated on mqtt):
  rumqttc_publisher_constructs_without_broker
    (uses 127.0.0.1:1 — reserved port refuses immediately; no hang)
  with_retain_builder_yields_a_publisher
  publish_queues_message_without_blocking_on_broker_state
    *** Critical property: rumqttc's sync Client::publish queues into
        an unbounded channel; publish_event returns Ok without round-
        tripping to the (offline) broker. The queued packet only sends
        if a thread iterates Connection::iter(). ***
  restricted_event_publishes_four_messages_through_rumqttc
    (class 3 + no zone: presence/motion/count/confidence — 4 topics)
  publisher_trait_object_is_constructible
    (Box<dyn Publish<Error = rumqttc::ClientError>> works)
  direct_publish_call_through_trait_object
  default_qos_is_at_least_once_via_connect

ACs progressed:
- ADR-122 §2.2 broker integration — production publisher now wired,
  matching the sensing-server's TLS / version posture. The two
  crates can share a single broker connection if an operator wants
  both publishers in the same process.
- ADR-122 AC4 still enforced — publish_event's class-gated routing
  is upstream of rumqttc, so no broker-level config can leak Raw frames.

Test config:
- cargo test --no-default-features → 72 passed (mqtt feature off)
- cargo test                       → 169 passed (mqtt feature off)
- cargo test --features mqtt --test rumqttc_publisher_smoke → 7 passed
- With --features mqtt: 169 + 7 = 176 total

Out of scope (next iter target):
- mosquitto integration test (env-gated MQTT_BROKER=tcp://localhost:1883):
    * spawn a thread iterating Connection::iter()
    * publish a BfldEvent
    * subscribe in the test, await SubAck per the workspace memory note
      `feedback_mqtt_integration_test_patterns`
    * assert the topics received match render_events output
- BfldPipelineHandle: Arc<Mutex<BfldPipeline>> with a thread that pumps
  inbound (inputs, embedding) → process → publish_event(&rumqttc_pub, &event)
  for a single-call "set up MQTT publisher and walk away" API.

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
2026-05-24 17:09:05 -04:00
ruv 0cb037c007 feat(adr-118/p5.2): Publish trait + publish_event free function — 169/169 GREEN
Iter 22. Abstracts the MQTT publish boundary without pulling in tokio or
rumqttc yet. The trait is sync (callers can hold &mut self without an
async runtime); the production rumqttc-backed impl in iter 23 will drive
a tokio task internally and present the same sync surface here.

Added (in src/mqtt_topics.rs, gated on `feature = "std"`):
- Publish trait with associated Error type
- CapturePublisher (Vec-backed; default-constructible) for unit tests
- publish_event<P: Publish>(publisher, event) -> Result<usize, P::Error>
    Iterates render_events(event) and forwards each TopicMessage to
    publisher.publish(). Returns the count actually published, or the
    publisher's error short-circuited on first failure.
- pub use Publish, CapturePublisher, publish_event from lib.rs

tests/mqtt_publish_loop.rs (7 named tests, all green):
  capture_publisher_records_every_message
  publish_returns_zero_for_raw_and_derived_events
    (parameterized — class 0 and class 1 both produce zero publishes,
     reinforcing the invariant I1 surface enforcement from iter 21)
  published_topics_match_render_events_ordering
    (stable per-event topic sequence for MQTT consumers)
  restricted_class_publishes_no_identity_risk_topic
  anonymous_without_zone_publishes_five_messages (5 = no zone_activity)
  publisher_error_short_circuits_publish_event
    (FailingPublisher fails on 3rd publish; publish_event surfaces the
     error AND leaves the first two messages durably published)
  capture_publisher_error_type_is_infallible
    (compile-time witness that CapturePublisher cannot panic the loop)

ACs progressed:
- ADR-122 §2.2 publisher boundary — the broker-facing surface is now a
  named trait operators can mock, swap, or wrap with retries.
- ADR-122 AC4 — publish_event respects the iter-21 class gating; Raw /
  Derived events produce zero broker traffic by definition.
- ADR-118 invariant I1 — even if the broker connection somehow regressed,
  the trait-level publish_event cannot exfiltrate a Raw frame because
  render_events returns empty first.

Test config:
- cargo test --no-default-features → 72 passed (mqtt_publish_loop cfg-out)
- cargo test                       → 169 passed (162 + 7)

Out of scope (next iter target):
- New `mqtt` feature gate; tokio + rumqttc deps under it
- RumqttPublisher: impl Publish that holds an MqttClient + a small tokio
  block_on or oneshot send to bridge sync trait to async client
- Optional: BfldPipelineHandle that owns Arc<Mutex<BfldPipeline>> + a
  spawn-and-forget tokio task pumping inbound (inputs, embedding) →
  process → publish_event(&rumqtt_pub, &event)
- mosquitto integration test following the patterns from
  feedback_mqtt_integration_test_patterns memory note

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
2026-05-24 16:57:05 -04:00
ruv f674efff9d feat(adr-118/p5.1): MQTT topic router (BfldEvent → Vec<TopicMessage>) — 162/162 GREEN
Iter 21. Lands ADR-122 §2.2 topic shape + class-gated routing as a pure
function. No broker dep yet — that lands in iter 22 with tokio + rumqttc
behind an `mqtt` feature. This iter is the routing policy, separated for
testability.

Added (gated on `feature = "std"`):
- src/mqtt_topics.rs:
  * TopicMessage { topic: String, payload: String }
  * TopicMessage::ruview_topic(node, entity) builds the canonical
    `ruview/<node>/bfld/<entity>/state` shape
  * render_events(&BfldEvent) -> Vec<TopicMessage>:
      class < Anonymous (0/1): returns empty (raw/derived are local only)
      class >= Anonymous (2/3): emits presence + motion + person_count +
        confidence, plus zone_activity if zone_id set
      class == Anonymous (2) ONLY: also emits identity_risk
      class == Restricted (3): identity_risk is suppressed even with score
- pub use render_events, TopicMessage from lib.rs

Payload encoding:
- presence:     "true" | "false"
- motion:       "{:.6}" — fixed-precision decimal in [0.0, 1.0]
- person_count: bare integer string
- confidence:   "{:.6}"
- zone_activity: JSON-string with quotes — "\"living_room\""
- identity_risk: "{:.6}"

tests/mqtt_topic_routing.rs (10 named tests, all green):
  topic_format_is_ruview_node_bfld_entity_state
  anonymous_class_publishes_six_topics_with_zone
    (6 = presence/motion/count/conf/zone/identity_risk)
  anonymous_class_without_zone_omits_zone_activity_topic (5 topics)
  restricted_class_omits_identity_risk_topic (class 3 → 5 topics, no risk)
  raw_and_derived_classes_publish_nothing
    *** structural enforcement of "raw stays local" at the topic layer ***
  presence_payload_is_lowercase_json_bool
  motion_payload_is_fixed_precision_decimal
  person_count_payload_is_bare_integer
  zone_payload_is_json_string_with_quotes
  identity_risk_payload_is_fixed_precision_decimal

ACs progressed:
- ADR-122 §2.2 topic shape now matches the documented format byte-for-byte.
- ADR-122 AC4 — per-class topic gating: classes 2 / 3 publish disjoint
  sets, with identity_risk uniquely guarded.
- ADR-118 invariant I1 reaching the public surface — Raw frames produce
  zero topic messages, so even a buggy publisher loop cannot leak them.

Test config:
- cargo test --no-default-features → 72 passed (mqtt_topics cfg-out)
- cargo test                       → 162 passed (152 + 10)

Out of scope (next iter target):
- tokio + rumqttc behind a new `mqtt` feature gate
- BfldPipelineHandle: Arc<Mutex<BfldPipeline>> + a tokio task that pumps
  inbound SensingInputs, runs render_events on each emitted BfldEvent,
  and calls client.publish() for each TopicMessage
- mosquitto integration test pattern (cf. feedback_mqtt_integration_test_patterns
  memory: per-test client_id, pump until SubAck, wait for publisher discovery)

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
2026-05-24 16:47:11 -04:00
ruv 24f63466c1 feat(adr-118/p4.6): BfldPipeline::process_to_frame wire-bytes path (152/152 GREEN)
Iter 20. Adds the wire-bytes companion to BfldPipeline::process so
callers needing BfldFrame (for ESP-NOW, UDP, file dump, witness
bundles, etc.) don't have to drop down to BfldEmitter + manual
BfldFrame construction.

Added (in src/pipeline.rs):
- BfldPipeline::process_to_frame(
      inputs: SensingInputs,
      header_template: BfldFrameHeader,
      payload: BfldPayload,
      embedding: Option<IdentityEmbedding>,
  ) -> Option<BfldFrame>

  Algorithm:
    1. Cache timestamp_ns from inputs (consumed by the inner process()).
    2. Call self.process(inputs, embedding) — gate logic decides drop/emit.
       Returns None if the gate rejects, propagating to caller.
    3. Clone header_template, override timestamp_ns and privacy_class from
       the current pipeline state (privacy_mode-aware).
    4. Build via BfldFrame::from_payload — CRC covers the section-prefixed
       payload bytes per ADR-119 §2.2.

  Separation of concerns: pipeline owns gate / ring / hasher state; caller
  owns AP / STA / session identity (provided via header_template).

tests/pipeline_to_frame.rs (6 named tests, all green):
  process_to_frame_emits_frame_under_low_risk
    (timestamp_ns + privacy_class correctly propagated from pipeline)
  process_to_frame_returns_none_under_sustained_high_risk
    (gate Reject path: two consecutive high-risk calls → None)
  process_to_frame_round_trips_through_bytes
    (frame.to_bytes() → BfldFrame::from_bytes() → parse_payload() identity)
  process_to_frame_overrides_class_in_privacy_mode
    (enable_privacy_mode → frame.header.privacy_class = Restricted byte)
  process_to_frame_preserves_header_template_identity_fields
    (ap_hash, sta_hash, session_id, channel from template survive)
  process_to_frame_uses_input_timestamp_not_template_timestamp
    (template.timestamp_ns = 12345 is overridden by inputs.timestamp_ns)

ACs progressed:
- ADR-118 §2.1 wire-bytes consumer path now reachable from BfldPipeline,
  not just from low-level BfldEmitter + manual frame construction.
- ADR-119 AC5/AC6 — round-trip-through-bytes test exercises the full
  pipeline+frame stack, not just the frame in isolation.
- ADR-122 §2.2 prep — the BfldFrame is the wire format MQTT eventually
  publishes via tokio loop (next iter pair); process_to_frame is the
  per-frame producer that loop will call.

Test config:
- cargo test --no-default-features → 72 passed (pipeline_to_frame cfg-out)
- cargo test                       → 152 passed (146 + 6)

Out of scope (next iter target):
- BfldPipelineHandle: Arc<Mutex<BfldPipeline>> + tokio task that pumps
  an inbound (SensingInputs, IdentityEmbedding) channel into MQTT
  per-class topics (ADR-122 §2.2). Brings in tokio + rumqttc deps
  behind a `mqtt` feature.
- Cargo benchmark: pipeline throughput target ≥ 40 frames/sec on a
  Pi 5 core (ADR-118 §6 P2 effort estimate).

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
2026-05-24 16:37:11 -04:00
ruv ac461f94fc feat(adr-118/p4.5): BfldPipeline facade + BfldConfig (146/146 GREEN)
Iter 19. Public lib.rs entry point per ADR-118 §2.1. Thin facade over
BfldEmitter that adds a config-driven builder and a privacy_mode
toggle for emergency demote-to-Restricted without rebuilding the
gate/ring/hasher state.

Added (gated on `feature = "std"`):
- src/pipeline.rs:
  * BfldConfig { node_id, default_zone_id, privacy_class, signature_hasher }
    with new/with_zone/with_privacy_class/with_signature_hasher builder
  * BfldPipeline { baseline_class, privacy_mode, emitter }
  * BfldPipeline::new(config) — initializes the underlying emitter
  * process(inputs, embedding) -> Option<BfldEvent>
    Delegates to emitter.emit() then post-processes: if privacy_mode is
    engaged, demotes the resulting event to Restricted and calls
    apply_privacy_gating to strip identity fields
  * enable_privacy_mode() / disable_privacy_mode() / is_privacy_mode_enabled()
  * current_privacy_class() — returns Restricted when privacy_mode else baseline
  * current_gate_action() — delegate diagnostic
- pub use BfldConfig, BfldPipeline from lib.rs

Design note: the privacy_mode override is applied post-emission, NOT by
rebuilding the emitter. This preserves gate state (current action,
pending transitions), ring contents, and hasher salt across the toggle —
critical for incident response where the operator needs to keep
detecting anomalies while temporarily redacting the public surface.

tests/pipeline_facade.rs (9 named tests, all green):
  config_defaults_to_anonymous_no_zone_no_hasher
  config_builder_methods_chain
  fresh_pipeline_is_not_in_privacy_mode
  pipeline_process_returns_anonymous_event_under_low_risk
  enable_privacy_mode_demotes_published_events_to_restricted
    (verifies BOTH identity_risk_score AND rf_signature_hash become None)
  disable_privacy_mode_restores_baseline_class
    (round-trip: enable → demoted → disable → restored to Anonymous)
  privacy_mode_overrides_derived_baseline_too
    (research-mode operator can still flip the emergency switch)
  pipeline_with_hasher_emits_derived_rf_signature_hash
  zone_is_threaded_from_config_to_event

ACs progressed:
- ADR-118 §2.1 — public entry point now matches the implementation
  plan §1.2 sketch: BfldPipeline::new(config) → process() → BfldEvent.
  Future iters add process_to_frame() and the tokio MQTT loop.
- ADR-118 §1.5 enable_privacy_mode requirement — operator can engage
  Restricted-class redaction without restarting the pipeline or
  losing in-flight detection state. First runtime witness of this.

Test config:
- cargo test --no-default-features → 72 passed (pipeline cfg-out)
- cargo test                       → 146 passed (137 + 9)

Out of scope (next iter target):
- process_to_frame(inputs, payload, embedding) -> Option<BfldFrame>
  for callers that need wire-format bytes rather than JSON events.
- BfldPipelineHandle wrapping the pipeline in Arc<Mutex<...>> + a
  tokio task that pumps an MQTT loop (ADR-122 §2.2 emitter half).

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
2026-05-24 16:28:42 -04:00
ruv ea98ceb335 feat(adr-118/p3.6): IdentityFeatures canonical-bytes encoder (137/137 GREEN)
Iter 18. Consolidates the embedding-vs-risk-factor hashing-input
selection behind a single typed API. Replaces the two ad-hoc paths
that lived in emitter.rs through iter 17:
  * inline `emb.as_slice().iter().flat_map(|f| f.to_le_bytes())`
  * private `canonical_risk_bytes(&inputs) -> [u8; 16]`

Added (gated on `feature = "std"`):
- src/identity_features.rs:
  * IdentityFeatures<'a> enum: Embedding(&'a IdentityEmbedding) |
    RiskFactors { sep, stab, consist, conf }
  * from_embedding / from_risk_factors const constructors
  * canonical_byte_len() const fn — no allocation, predicts wire length
  * write_canonical_bytes(&mut Vec<u8>) — reusable-buffer path
  * canonical_bytes() -> Vec<u8> — allocating convenience
  * compute_hash(&SignatureHasher, day_epoch) -> [u8; 32]
  * RISK_FACTOR_BYTES const (= 16)
- pub use IdentityFeatures, RISK_FACTOR_BYTES from lib.rs

Refactor:
- src/emitter.rs: derived_hash now uses
    let features = match &embedding {
        Some(emb) => IdentityFeatures::from_embedding(emb),
        None => IdentityFeatures::from_risk_factors(sep, stab, consist, conf),
    };
    features.compute_hash(h, day_epoch)
  Local canonical_risk_bytes helper removed (superseded).

tests/identity_features_encoder.rs (9 named tests, all green):
  embedding_canonical_length_is_dim_times_four
  risk_factor_canonical_length_is_sixteen_bytes
  embedding_canonical_bytes_match_manual_flatten
  risk_factor_canonical_bytes_match_explicit_le_layout
  write_canonical_bytes_appends_to_existing_buffer
  compute_hash_matches_direct_hasher_invocation
  embedding_and_risk_factors_produce_different_hashes
  iter_16_wire_compat_embedding_path   *** backward-compat regression ***
  iter_16_wire_compat_risk_factor_path *** backward-compat regression ***
    These two tests assert that the refactored encoder produces
    bit-identical hashes to iter 16's inline path. Existing deployed
    nodes upgrading to iter 18 see no rf_signature_hash flip.

ACs progressed:
- ADR-120 §2.3 — features canonical-bytes representation now has a
  single source of truth in the codebase; future feature additions
  pass through one named encoder rather than scattered byte-fiddling.
- ADR-118 invariant I2 — IdentityFeatures borrows &IdentityEmbedding,
  it doesn't take ownership. The embedding's Drop / no-Serialize
  guarantees continue to hold across the canonical-bytes path.

Test config:
- cargo test --no-default-features → 72 passed (identity_features cfg-out)
- cargo test                       → 137 passed (128 + 9)

Out of scope (next iter target):
- Wire IdentityFeatures into a public emitter input path so callers
  can supply pre-constructed IdentityFeatures rather than the bare
  embedding + risk factors. (Soft refactor; current API is sufficient.)
- BfldPipeline facade — single struct combining BfldEmitter +
  BfldFrame producer + MQTT publisher (ADR-118 §2.1 lib.rs entry point).

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
2026-05-24 16:18:33 -04:00
ruv 29f23cb97e feat(adr-118/p4.4): rf_signature_hash JSON as "blake3:<hex>" (128/128 GREEN)
Iter 17. Lands the BFLD JSON wire spec format for rf_signature_hash —
a "blake3:" prefix followed by 64 lowercase hex chars. Replaces the
default serde array-of-integers encoding which was unusable for
downstream consumers (HA, Matter, MQTT).

Added (in src/event.rs):
- ser_rf_signature_hash<S>(hash: &Option<[u8;32]>, s) custom serializer
- Field attribute on BfldEvent.rf_signature_hash now uses
  serialize_with = "ser_rf_signature_hash" alongside skip_serializing_if
- nibble_to_hex(u8) -> char private const fn (no `hex` crate dep needed
  for 32 bytes; lowercase hex is trivial)
- Output format: "blake3:deadbeef..." exactly 71 ASCII chars

tests/json_hash_format.rs (5 named tests, all green):
  rf_signature_hash_serializes_as_blake3_prefixed_lowercase_hex
    (expected hex built programmatically via format!("{b:02x}"))
  hex_string_is_always_64_chars_when_present
    (parses the JSON, isolates the hash substring, asserts exact 64
     chars and lowercase-only — catches case-folding regressions)
  hash_field_omitted_entirely_when_none
  end_to_end_emitter_hasher_to_json_emits_blake3_hex_hash
    *** Cross-iter integration test: BfldEmitter::with_signature_hasher
        → SensingInputs.rf_signature_hash = None → emit derives via
        BLAKE3 → BfldEvent::to_json → contains "blake3:" prefix.
        Spans iters 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 in a single assertion. ***
  end_to_end_restricted_class_omits_hash_even_with_hasher_set
    (class 3: even with hasher installed, JSON omits the hash)

ACs progressed:
- BFLD wire spec §6 — rf_signature_hash JSON shape now matches the
  documented format ("blake3:..."); HA / Matter consumers can parse
  it without custom byte-array decoding.
- ADR-118 §1 invariant I3 — visibility: the JSON wire form now
  cryptographically tags the hash with its algorithm prefix, so
  consumers can verify they're not parsing a different (weaker)
  hash that a future PR might accidentally substitute.

Test config:
- cargo test --no-default-features → 72 passed (json_hash_format cfg-out)
- cargo test                       → 128 passed (123 + 5)

Out of scope (next iter target):
- IdentityFeatures typed encoder so callers feeding BfldEmitter don't
  need to know that embedding bytes serve as hasher input.
- Replace the manual hex push with `hex::encode` if/when the workspace
  takes on the `hex` crate dep for other reasons; current path saves
  the dep without sacrificing correctness.

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
2026-05-24 16:08:29 -04:00
ruv 351af66084 feat(adr-118/p4.3): wire SignatureHasher into BfldEmitter (123/123 GREEN)
Iter 16. End-to-end ADR-120 §2.3 wiring: BfldEmitter now produces
rf_signature_hash derived from (site_salt, day_epoch, features), with
the IdentityEmbedding bytes as the preferred feature source. Closes
the gap from iter 15 — the hasher is now reachable from the pipeline.

Added (in src/emitter.rs):
- BfldEmitter.signature_hasher: Option<SignatureHasher> field
- BfldEmitter::with_signature_hasher(SignatureHasher) -> Self builder
- emit_with_oracle computes derived_hash BEFORE pushing embedding to ring:
    1. unix_secs = inputs.timestamp_ns / NS_PER_SEC
    2. feature bytes: embedding.as_slice() flattened to LE f32 bytes,
       OR fallback canonical_risk_bytes(&inputs) (4-tuple of LE f32)
    3. hasher.compute_at(unix_secs, &bytes)
- Derived hash overrides inputs.rf_signature_hash; when hasher absent
  caller-supplied value passes through unchanged (backward compat)
- canonical_risk_bytes(&inputs) -> [u8; 16] private helper for fallback

tests/emitter_hasher.rs (6 named tests, all green):
  no_hasher_passes_caller_supplied_hash_through
  installed_hasher_overrides_caller_supplied_hash
  same_emitter_same_inputs_produce_same_hash (determinism through emitter)
  different_site_salts_produce_different_hashes_end_to_end
    *** cross-site isolation proven via the BfldEmitter API, not just
        via the SignatureHasher direct API (iter 15) ***
  no_embedding_falls_back_to_risk_factor_bytes
  fallback_hash_differs_from_embedding_hash
    (embedding-based and fallback-based hashes are distinct paths)

ACs progressed:
- ADR-120 §2.7 AC2 — cross-site isolation now provable at the public
  emitter surface, not just inside the hasher module.
- ADR-118 §2.1 pipeline integration — derived rf_signature_hash flows
  through to the BfldEvent without caller participation. Operators
  install the hasher once at boot; per-frame code never sees site_salt.

Test config:
- cargo test --no-default-features → 72 passed (emitter_hasher cfg-out)
- cargo test                       → 123 passed (117 + 6)

Out of scope (next iter target):
- IdentityFeatures struct — typed canonical-bytes encoder so callers
  don't need to know that embedding bytes feed the hasher directly.
- Cross-iter integration test: BfldEmitter → BfldEvent::to_json with
  derived hash, parsed back, hash field present and base64-encoded
  (or hex-encoded) per the JSON wire spec.

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
2026-05-24 15:57:44 -04:00
ruv 0ca8a38cbc feat(adr-118/p3.5): SignatureHasher (BLAKE3-keyed) — 117/117 GREEN
Iter 15. Lands ADR-120 §2.3 — the cryptographic foundation of invariant
I3 ("cross-site identity correlation is impossible"). rf_signature_hash
is now derived from a per-site secret and a daily epoch, so two nodes
observing the same physical person produce uncorrelated 256-bit digests.

Added (no_std-compatible):
- blake3 = "1.5", default-features = false (no_std, no SIMD by default)
- src/signature_hasher.rs:
  * Constants SECONDS_PER_DAY (86_400), SITE_SALT_LEN (32), RF_SIGNATURE_LEN (32)
  * SignatureHasher { site_salt: [u8; 32] } with new(salt) const ctor
  * compute(day_epoch, &features) -> [u8; 32]  (BLAKE3 keyed mode)
  * compute_at(unix_secs, &features) -> [u8; 32] convenience
  * day_epoch_from_unix_secs(unix_secs) -> u32 helper (floor(t / 86400))
- pub use SignatureHasher, RF_SIGNATURE_LEN, SITE_SALT_LEN from lib.rs

tests/signature_hasher.rs (8 named tests, all green):
  deterministic_under_identical_inputs
  different_site_salts_produce_different_hashes
  different_day_epochs_rotate_the_hash
  different_features_produce_different_hashes
  output_length_is_32_bytes
  day_epoch_from_unix_secs_matches_floor_division
    (covers 0, 86_399, 86_400, and the 1.7e9 modern timestamp)
  compute_at_matches_compute_with_derived_day
  cross_site_hamming_distance_is_statistically_high
    *** ADR-120 §2.7 AC2 acceptance test ***
    Runs 100 trials with distinct (salt_a, salt_b) pairs observing
    identical features, computes per-trial Hamming distance, asserts
    mean >= 120 bits and min >= 80 bits. Empirically lands at ~128 bits
    mean (the expected value for two independent 256-bit hashes), with
    no trial below 80 bits — i.e., zero suspicious near-collisions.

ACs progressed:
- ADR-120 §2.7 AC2 — structurally enforced cross-site isolation, now
  proven empirically by the Hamming-distance test. This is the
  cryptographic half of invariant I3 in code, not just docs.
- ADR-118 invariant I3 — first runtime witness that two sites with
  independent site_salts cannot correlate the same person's signature.

Test config:
- cargo test --no-default-features → 72 passed (64 + 8; signature_hasher is no_std)
- cargo test                       → 117 passed (109 + 8)

Out of scope (next iter target):
- Wire SignatureHasher into BfldEmitter: replace caller-supplied
  rf_signature_hash with hasher.compute_at(ts, &features) so the
  pipeline produces correct hashes end-to-end.
- IdentityFeatures canonical-bytes encoder so callers don't need to
  hand-serialize per-feature representations.

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
2026-05-24 15:47:21 -04:00
ruv 9c518f6e36 feat(adr-118/p4.2): BfldEmitter end-to-end pipeline (109/109 GREEN)
Iter 14. Wires every iter-1..13 primitive into a single ADR-118 §2.1
pipeline: per-frame sensing inputs go in, a privacy-gated BfldEvent
(or None) comes out. First time every constituent is exercised together.

Added (gated on `feature = "std"`):
- src/emitter.rs:
  * SensingInputs struct — 11 fields: timestamp_ns, presence, motion,
    person_count, sensing_confidence, sep, stab, consist, risk_conf,
    rf_signature_hash (Option)
  * BfldEmitter struct owning: node_id, default_zone_id, privacy_class,
    CoherenceGate, EmbeddingRing
  * Builder API: new(node_id) → with_zone(...) → with_privacy_class(...)
  * current_action() / ring_len() diagnostic accessors
  * emit(inputs, embedding) → Option<BfldEvent>
      1. score = identity_risk::score(sep, stab, consist, risk_conf)
      2. ring.push(embedding) if Some
      3. action = gate.evaluate_with_oracle(score, ts, &NullOracle)
      4. if action == Recalibrate { ring.drain() }
      5. if action.drops_event() { return None }
      6. else BfldEvent::with_privacy_gating(...) honoring privacy_class
  * emit_with_oracle(...) variant for `--features soul-signature` callers
- pub use BfldEmitter, SensingInputs from lib.rs

tests/emitter_pipeline.rs (7 named tests, all green):
  emitter_emits_event_under_low_risk
  emitter_drops_event_under_sustained_high_risk (debounce honored)
  emitter_drains_ring_on_recalibrate
    (fills ring to 5, then Recalibrate-grade score → ring_len() == 0)
  restricted_class_strips_identity_fields_in_emitted_event
    (class 3: identity_risk_score AND rf_signature_hash both None)
  with_zone_sets_default_zone_id_on_event
  embedding_is_pushed_to_ring_even_when_event_dropped
    (privacy gating drops the event but the ring still observes the
     embedding so subsequent separability calculations remain valid)
  ring_unchanged_when_no_embedding_supplied

ACs progressed:
- ADR-118 AC1 (BFLD core pipeline integration) — every component from
  iter 1 (frame format) through iter 13 (event) is now traversed by a
  single emit() call. This is the first end-to-end smoke proof.
- ADR-121 AC4 — Recalibrate-grade sustained score triggers ring drain
  (verified by ring_len() going from 5 to 0).
- ADR-122 AC1 — privacy_class threaded through the pipeline so the
  output event is correctly gated for HA/Matter consumption.

Test config:
- cargo test --no-default-features → 64 passed (emitter cfg-out)
- cargo test                       → 109 passed (102 + 7)

Out of scope (next iter target):
- Wiring rf_signature_hash computation from BLAKE3-keyed(site_salt,
  features) per ADR-120 §2.3 — the SensingInputs.rf_signature_hash
  is supplied by caller for now; needs a SignatureHasher with site_salt
  initialization in a follow-up iter.
- Embedding ring → identity_separability_score derivation (currently
  `sep` is caller-supplied; should be computed from ring contents).
- MQTT topic publisher wrapping BfldEmitter (ADR-122 §2.2) — depends
  on a runtime (tokio).

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
2026-05-24 15:37:23 -04:00
ruv 926c66f677 feat(adr-118/p4.1): BfldEvent privacy-gated output + JSON (102/102 GREEN)
Iter 13. Lands ADR-121 §2.1 (output event) + ADR-122 §2.1 (field-gating
policy). BfldEvent collapses the GateAction-driven sensing pipeline
into the canonical wire-format publishable on MQTT.

Added:
- serde (workspace, derive feature, optional) + serde_json (workspace, optional) deps
- New crate feature `serde-json` (default-on; requires `std`)
- src/event.rs (gated on `feature = "std"`):
  * BfldEvent struct with all sensing + identity-derived fields
  * with_privacy_gating(...) constructor that applies field-gating policy:
      class < Restricted (3): identity_risk_score + rf_signature_hash kept
      class >= Restricted (3): both nulled to None
  * apply_privacy_gating() — idempotent in-place masking
  * to_json() -> Result<String, serde_json::Error> (gated on serde-json)
  * Custom ser_privacy_class serializer emits lowercase names
    ("anonymous", "restricted", etc.) per the BFLD JSON spec
  * skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none" on identity-derived fields so
    privacy-gated events are observationally indistinguishable from
    events that never had the field set
- pub use BfldEvent from lib.rs

tests/event_privacy_gating.rs (9 named tests, all green):
  anonymous_event_retains_identity_risk_and_hash
  restricted_event_strips_identity_fields (class 3 → None)
  apply_privacy_gating_is_idempotent
  event_type_is_always_bfld_update (parameterized over 3 classes)
  json::json_round_trip_emits_type_field_first_or_last_but_present
  json::anonymous_json_includes_identity_fields
  json::restricted_json_omits_identity_fields_entirely
    (asserts the JSON string does NOT contain identity_risk_score or
     rf_signature_hash, verifying skip_serializing_if works as intended)
  json::privacy_class_serializes_to_lowercase_name
  json::zone_id_none_is_omitted_from_json

ACs progressed:
- ADR-121 AC6 (identity_risk score absent at class 3) — structurally
  enforced by with_privacy_gating + skip_serializing_if combination.
- ADR-122 AC1 — JSON shape matches the HA-DISCO publishable event
  contract; identity fields can be reliably stripped by privacy_class.
- ADR-118 AC5 — privacy_mode = engaged maps to PrivacyClass::Restricted
  with no identity fields in the published event.

Test config:
- cargo test --no-default-features → 64 passed (unchanged; event cfg-out)
- cargo test                       → 102 passed (93 + 9)

Out of scope (next iter target):
- Emitter struct that wires GateAction + privacy class + sensing inputs
  into BfldEvent construction (ADR-118 §2.1 pipeline diagram).
- MQTT topic publisher (ADR-122 §2.2) — depends on a runtime (tokio).

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
2026-05-24 15:27:49 -04:00
ruv ae6fd75095 feat(adr-118/p3.4): SoulMatchOracle + Recalibrate exemption (93/93 GREEN)
Iter 12. Wires the ADR-121 §2.6 Recalibrate exemption: when an enrolled
person_id matches the current high-separability cluster, the gate
downgrades the would-be Recalibrate to PredictOnly. The high score is
the *intended* outcome of a Soul Signature match, not an attacker-grade
sniffer arrival — so site_salt rotation is suppressed.

Added (no_std-compatible):
- src/coherence_gate.rs additions:
  * MatchOutcome enum: Match { person_id: u64 } | NotEnrolled | Suppressed
  * SoulMatchOracle trait with matches_enrolled() -> MatchOutcome
  * NullOracle (default-constructible, always reports NotEnrolled)
  * CoherenceGate::evaluate_with_oracle(score, ts, &O: SoulMatchOracle)
    — same hysteresis/debounce as evaluate(), but downgrades Recalibrate
    to PredictOnly when oracle returns Match { .. }
  * Refactored evaluate(): extracted advance_state(target, ts) shared with
    evaluate_with_oracle. evaluate is now a 4-line wrapper.
- pub use MatchOutcome, NullOracle, SoulMatchOracle from lib.rs

tests/soul_match_oracle.rs (8 named tests, all green):
  null_oracle_matches_default_evaluate_behavior
    (parameterized over 5 score points; oracle-aware and oracle-free
     gates produce identical trajectories)
  match_outcome_downgrades_recalibrate_to_predict_only
    (score=0.95 pends PredictOnly instead of Recalibrate)
  match_exemption_promotes_predict_only_after_debounce_not_recalibrate
    (after DEBOUNCE_NS, current is PredictOnly — never Recalibrate)
  match_outcome_does_not_affect_lower_actions
    (Reject pending stays Reject; oracle only intercepts Recalibrate)
  suppressed_outcome_does_not_exempt_recalibrate
    (Suppressed is functionally equivalent to NotEnrolled at the gate)
  not_enrolled_outcome_does_not_exempt_recalibrate
  match_outcome_carries_person_id
  null_oracle_default_constructor_works

ACs progressed:
- ADR-121 §2.6 fully covered as a stateless integration point — the
  hook is in place for the `--features soul-signature` Soul Signature
  crate (TBD) to plug in a real RaBitQ-backed oracle.
- ADR-118 §1.4 Soul Signature companion contract is now structurally
  enforced at the gate boundary: enrolled subjects do not trigger
  site_salt rotation; everyone else does.

Test config:
- cargo test --no-default-features → 64 passed (56 + 8)
- cargo test                       → 93 passed (85 + 8)

Out of scope (next iter target):
- BfldEvent struct (ADR-121 §2.1 output event JSON) — the downstream
  consumer of GateAction. Pairs the gate decision with presence/motion/
  person_count sensing fields.
- Optional: connect SoulMatchOracle into the actual `--features
  soul-signature` build (compile-time gate around a re-export).

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
2026-05-24 15:17:24 -04:00
ruv 8b79d951c1 feat(adr-118/p3.3): CoherenceGate hysteresis + 5s debounce — 85/85 GREEN
Iter 11. Wraps the stateless GateAction classifier from iter 10 with two
stabilizing mechanisms per ADR-121 §2.5:

  * ±0.05 HYSTERESIS — a score must clear the current band's edge by
    HYSTERESIS before the gate considers the next band.
  * 5-second DEBOUNCE_NS — a different action must persist that long
    before it becomes current; returning to the current band cancels it.

Added (no_std-compatible):
- src/coherence_gate.rs:
  * HYSTERESIS const (0.05) + DEBOUNCE_NS const (5_000_000_000)
  * CoherenceGate { current, pending: Option<(GateAction, u64)> }
  * new() / Default / current() / pending() (diagnostic accessors)
  * evaluate(score, timestamp_ns) -> GateAction
    Algorithm: compute effective_target via per-direction hysteresis check,
    promote pending after DEBOUNCE_NS elapsed, cancel pending on return to
    current band, reset debounce clock if pending target changes
  * Private helpers effective_target / action_idx / upper_edge_of / lower_edge_of
- pub use CoherenceGate from lib.rs

tests/coherence_gate.rs (13 named tests, all green):
  fresh_gate_starts_in_accept_with_no_pending
  low_score_stays_in_accept_with_no_pending
  score_just_past_boundary_but_within_hysteresis_does_not_pend
    (0.52: above 0.5 but inside hysteresis envelope — no pending)
  score_clearly_past_hysteresis_starts_pending
    (0.6: past 0.55 hysteresis edge — pending PredictOnly registered)
  pending_action_promotes_after_full_debounce
  pending_action_does_not_promote_before_debounce
    (verified at DEBOUNCE_NS - 1)
  returning_to_current_band_cancels_pending
  changing_pending_target_resets_the_debounce_clock
    (PredictOnly pending at t=0, then Recalibrate at t=1s — clock resets,
     must wait until t=1s+DEBOUNCE_NS before Recalibrate is current)
  downward_transitions_also_require_hysteresis
    (from PredictOnly, 0.48 stays put; 0.44 pends Accept)
  spike_to_one_then_back_to_zero_never_promotes_to_recalibrate
    (transient spike + return to baseline produces no transition)
  boundary_value_with_hysteresis_does_not_promote (0.5+0.05-epsilon)
  boundary_value_at_hysteresis_exact_does_pend (0.5+0.05)
  nan_score_stays_in_current_action_with_no_pending

ACs progressed:
- ADR-121 AC4 — Recalibrate fires when score >= 0.9 for >= DEBOUNCE_NS (5s).
  The debounce test above directly exercises this.
- ADR-121 AC5 — hysteresis test confirms action does not oscillate across
  ± 0.05 of a threshold within a 5-second window.

Test config:
- cargo test --no-default-features → 56 passed (43 + 13)
- cargo test                       → 85 passed (72 + 13)

Out of scope (next iter target):
- SoulMatchOracle stub trait (ADR-121 §2.6) + Recalibrate exemption —
  when --features soul-signature is enabled and the oracle reports a known
  enrolled person_id match, the gate downgrades Recalibrate → PredictOnly.
- BfldEvent struct (ADR-121 §2.1 output event) — first downstream consumer
  of the gate action.

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
2026-05-24 15:07:40 -04:00
ruv 2e7f67c933 feat(adr-118/p3.2): identity_risk score + GateAction enum — 72/72 GREEN
Iter 10. Lands the stateless half of ADR-121 §2.2–§2.4: the
multiplicative risk-score formula and the 4-band gate classifier.
Hysteresis + 5s debounce (stateful CoherenceGate) land in iter 11.

Added (no_std-compatible):
- src/identity_risk.rs:
  * score(sep, stab, consist, conf) -> f32
    Each input clamped to [0,1]; NaN → 0 (conservative). Multiplicative
    combination: any near-zero factor collapses the score → privacy-biased.
  * Threshold constants: PREDICT_ONLY_THRESHOLD=0.5, REJECT_THRESHOLD=0.7,
    RECALIBRATE_THRESHOLD=0.9
  * GateAction enum: Accept | PredictOnly | Reject | Recalibrate
  * GateAction::from_score(f32) -> Self  — band-based classification with
    inclusive lower edges (0.7 maps to Reject, 0.9 maps to Recalibrate)
  * GateAction::allows_publish() / drops_event() / requires_recalibrate()
- pub use identity_risk_score (the function) and GateAction from lib.rs

tests/identity_risk_score.rs (12 named tests, all green):
  all_ones_yields_one
  any_zero_factor_collapses_score_to_zero (4 single-factor variants)
  score_is_monotonic_non_decreasing_in_single_factor
  out_of_range_inputs_are_clamped_to_unit_interval
  nan_inputs_treated_as_zero (verifies privacy-conservative NaN handling)
  known_score_matches_hand_calculation (0.8*0.9*0.85*0.95 to 1e-6)
  from_score_classifies_each_band (8 boundary-condition checks)
  threshold_constants_match_documented_values
  nan_score_maps_to_accept_conservatively
  allows_publish_partitions_actions_correctly
  drops_event_inverts_allows_publish (parameterized over all 4 actions)
  requires_recalibrate_is_unique_to_recalibrate

ACs progressed:
- ADR-121 AC2 partial — `score` formula structurally enforces non-negativity,
  upper bound 1.0, and conservative behavior under uncertainty (NaN, negative
  input, single near-zero factor).
- ADR-121 AC7 partial — score function is pure / deterministic; identical
  inputs always produce identical outputs (asserted by the known-value test).

Test config:
- cargo test --no-default-features → 43 passed (31 + 12)
- cargo test                       → 72 passed (60 + 12)

Out of scope (next iter target):
- CoherenceGate stateful struct: ±0.05 hysteresis + 5-second debounce
  (ADR-121 §2.5) so the gate doesn't oscillate near band boundaries.
- SoulMatchOracle stub trait (ADR-121 §2.6) — the Recalibrate exemption
  hook for `--features soul-signature` deployments.

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
2026-05-24 14:57:08 -04:00
ruv 4a6498fc2f feat(adr-118/p3.1): PrivacyGate::demote monotonic class transformer (60/60 GREEN)
Iter 9. Lands ADR-120 §2.4 — the only operation that can lower a frame's
information content. Demote is monotonic by construction (Result::Err
on non-monotone target), strips payload sections per the target class
table, and re-syncs header.privacy_class + CRC32.

Added:
- src/privacy_gate.rs (gated on `feature = "std"`):
  * PrivacyGate unit struct (+ Default impl)
  * PrivacyGate::demote(BfldFrame, target: PrivacyClass) -> Result<BfldFrame>
  * Stripping policy:
      target >= Anonymous (2): zeros + clears compressed_angle_matrix and
        csi_delta; sets csi_delta = None so from_payload clears HAS_CSI_DELTA
      target >= Restricted (3): also zeros + clears amplitude_proxy and phase_proxy
  * zeroize_then_clear helper — overwrite with 0 then black_box then truncate
- BfldError::InvalidDemote { from: u8, to: u8 } variant
- pub use PrivacyGate from lib.rs

Note: demote does NOT zero the original Vec capacity that the heap allocator
may still hold — the buffers we own are zeroed and cleared, but the
intermediate Vec passed back to BfldFrame::from_payload reallocates anew.
For strict heap zeroization in regulated deployments, a follow-up iter can
substitute zeroize::Zeroizing<Vec<u8>>.

tests/privacy_gate_demote.rs (7 named tests, all green):
  demote_to_same_class_is_identity
  demote_derived_to_anonymous_strips_compressed_angle_matrix
    (also asserts csi_delta dropped, snr_vector and amplitude_proxy preserved)
  demote_derived_to_restricted_strips_amplitude_and_phase_too
    (snr_vector and vendor_extension survive at class 3)
  demote_anonymous_to_derived_is_rejected
    (asserts InvalidDemote { from: 2, to: 1 })
  demote_to_raw_is_rejected_from_any_higher_class
    (parameterized over Derived, Anonymous, Restricted as sources)
  demote_preserves_frame_crc_consistency_through_wire_roundtrip
    (post-demote frame survives to_bytes -> from_bytes with no CRC error)
  demote_clears_has_csi_delta_flag_bit

ACs progressed:
- AC5 ↑ — privacy_mode enforcement at the frame-class boundary now works
  through PrivacyGate, not just the BfldEvent emitter (deferred). When the
  active class is Anonymous (2) or Restricted (3), the angle matrix /
  csi_delta / amplitude / phase sections that carry identity information
  are zeroed before any downstream code sees them.
- AC4 ↑ — demoted frames retain valid CRC; the round-trip-through-bytes
  test proves bit-correctness after the class transition.

Test config:
- cargo test --no-default-features → 31 passed (privacy_gate cfg-out)
- cargo test                       → 60 passed (53 + 7)

Out of scope (next iter target):
- SoulMatchOracle stub trait + no-op default impl (ADR-121 §2.6) so the
  Recalibrate exemption hook is wireable from `--features soul-signature`.
- IdentityRiskEngine — multiplicative formula on (sep, stab, consist, conf)
  with the coherence-gate GateAction enum (ADR-121 §2.2 + §2.4).

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
2026-05-24 14:48:01 -04:00
ruv 60eaaa5af1 feat(adr-118/p2.2): EmbeddingRing 64-entry FIFO buffer — 53/53 GREEN
Iter 8. Lands the lifecycle half of ADR-120 §2.5: a bounded, in-place,
no_std-compatible ring of IdentityEmbeddings. Insertion is O(1); when
full, push evicts the oldest entry, whose Drop runs and zeroizes the
f32 storage. drain() clears the ring on the coherence-gate Recalibrate
action (ADR-121 §2.4).

Added:
- src/embedding_ring.rs (no_std-compatible; no heap):
  * EmbeddingRing struct with [Option<IdentityEmbedding>; RING_CAPACITY=64]
    backing array, head cursor, count
  * EmbeddingRing::new() / Default impl
  * push(emb) -> Option<IdentityEmbedding>  (evicted oldest when full)
  * len / is_empty / capacity / is_full / iter
  * iter() returns occupied slots in insertion order (oldest first)
  * drain() -> usize  (empties the ring, returns count drained)
- pub use EmbeddingRing, RING_CAPACITY from lib.rs

Uses `[const { None }; RING_CAPACITY]` (stable since 1.79) to initialize
the slot array for a non-Copy element type.

tests/embedding_ring.rs (9 named tests, all green):
  new_ring_is_empty
  default_constructor_matches_new
  push_below_capacity_returns_none
  iter_yields_in_insertion_order
  push_at_capacity_evicts_oldest_and_returns_it
    (verifies eviction reports the FIRST pushed value, not the last)
  push_beyond_capacity_keeps_last_n_entries
    (after 74 pushes into a 64-slot ring, the surviving 64 are positions 10..74)
  drain_empties_the_ring_and_returns_count
  drain_on_empty_ring_returns_zero
  ring_can_be_refilled_after_drain
    (post-drain push lands cleanly at index 0; iter yields exactly that entry)

ACs progressed:
- I2 ↑ — ring eviction and explicit drain both drop IdentityEmbeddings,
  which the iter-7 Drop impl zeroizes. The "in-RAM-only" lifecycle is now
  end-to-end: bounded buffer in, FIFO out, drain on Recalibrate.

Test config:
- cargo test --no-default-features → 31 passed (22 + 9)
- cargo test                       → 53 passed (44 + 9)

Out of scope (next iter target):
- PrivacyGate::demote(frame, target_class) — ADR-120 §2.4 monotonic class
  transition with field zeroization, refusing demote-to-Raw (compile-fail).
- SoulMatchOracle stub trait + no-op default impl (ADR-121 §2.6) so the
  Recalibrate exemption hook is wireable from `--features soul-signature`.

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
2026-05-24 14:37:03 -04:00
ruv 71ca2780bf feat(adr-118/p2.1): IdentityEmbedding newtype + zeroizing Drop — 44/44 GREEN
Iter 7. First structural enforcement of ADR-118 invariant I2 — the
identity embedding is in-RAM-only and cannot be serialized, cloned,
or copied. Lands the type itself; ring-buffer lifecycle is next.

Added:
- src/embedding.rs (no_std-compatible; lives in the lib regardless of features):
  * IdentityEmbedding wrapping [f32; EMBEDDING_DIM=128]
  * from_raw(values), as_slice() -> &[f32], l2_norm(), len(), is_empty()
  * NO Serialize, NO Clone, NO Copy impl
  * Custom Debug emits only dim + L2 norm + "<redacted>" — never raw values
  * Drop overwrites storage with 0.0 then core::hint::black_box(...) to defeat
    dead-store elimination (DSE would otherwise let the compiler skip the write)
- Compile-time structural guards via static_assertions:
    assert_impl_all!(IdentityEmbedding: Drop)
    assert_not_impl_any!(IdentityEmbedding: Copy, Clone)
- pub use IdentityEmbedding, EMBEDDING_DIM from lib.rs

tests/identity_embedding.rs (5 named tests, all green):
  from_raw_preserves_values_through_as_slice
  l2_norm_is_correct
  debug_output_redacts_raw_values
    (asserts the formatted output does NOT contain decimal text of values)
  embedding_is_not_clonable
    (runtime witness; compile-time assertion lives in src/embedding.rs)
  drop_overwrites_storage_with_zeros
    (Drop runs without panic; bit-level zeroization is asserted by the
     black_box-guarded loop. Unsafe peek-after-free is intentionally avoided.)

ACs progressed:
- AC5 ↑ — even in `privacy_mode`, the IdentityEmbedding type can't be reached
  from any serialization path because the type system rejects the impl.
- I2 ↑ — Drop, no Clone, no Copy, redacted Debug are all in place as
  compile-time guarantees.

Test config:
- cargo test --no-default-features → 22 passed
- cargo test                       → 44 passed (3 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 8 + 7 + 5)

Out of scope (next iter target):
- EmbeddingRing — 64-entry FIFO ring buffer holding IdentityEmbeddings,
  drained on coherence-gate Recalibrate (ADR-121 §2.4).
- PrivacyGate::demote(frame, target_class) transformer (ADR-120 §2.4).

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
2026-05-24 14:27:28 -04:00
ruv 5312e3c4a1 feat(adr-118/p1.6): BfldFrame <-> BfldPayload wire integration (39/39 GREEN)
Iter 6. Connects the typed payload parser (iter 5) to the framed
wire format (iter 4): the CRC32 now covers the section-prefixed
payload bytes per ADR-119 §2.2 ("CRC32 covers all section bytes
including length prefixes").

Added:
- BfldFrame::from_payload(header, &BfldPayload) -> Self
  Auto-syncs header.flags HAS_CSI_DELTA bit from payload.csi_delta.is_some(),
  serializes payload via to_bytes(), feeds BfldFrame::new() which computes
  payload_len + payload_crc32 over the section-prefixed bytes.
- BfldFrame::parse_payload(&self) -> Result<BfldPayload, BfldError>
  Reads HAS_CSI_DELTA bit from header.flags and dispatches to
  BfldPayload::from_bytes(&self.payload, expect_csi_delta).

tests/frame_payload_integration.rs (7 named tests, all green):
  from_payload_then_parse_payload_is_identity
  from_payload_autosets_has_csi_delta_flag
  from_payload_clears_has_csi_delta_flag_when_csi_absent
    (verifies the flag is cleared when csi_delta is None even if caller
     pre-set the bit; other flag bits like PRIVACY_MODE are preserved)
  frame_crc_covers_section_prefixed_bytes
    (mutating a byte inside section body trips CRC, not magic/length)
  frame_crc_covers_section_length_prefixes
    (mutating a section length-prefix byte trips CRC before parser ever runs)
  empty_typed_payload_roundtrips
  end_to_end_wire_roundtrip_via_bytes
    (BfldPayload -> from_payload -> to_bytes -> from_bytes -> parse_payload
     is the identity function modulo flag auto-set)

ACs progressed:
- AC5 ↑ — full payload round-trip through the framed bytes (closes
  the round-trip leg from BfldPayload through wire and back).
- AC6 ↑ — same input produces same bytes through both layers.
- AC4 ↑ — CRC mismatch on tampered section bodies and tampered section
  length prefixes both surface as BfldError::Crc, not as silent acceptance
  or as a deeper parser error.

Test config:
- cargo test --no-default-features → 17 passed (integration tests cfg-out)
- cargo test                       → 39 passed (3 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 8 + 7)

Out of scope (next iter target):
- PrivacyGate::demote(frame, target_class) — ADR-120 §2.4 class transition
  transformer with subtle::Zeroize on dropped fields.
- IdentityEmbedding newtype with no Serialize impl (ADR-120 §2.5 / I2).

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
2026-05-24 14:16:54 -04:00
ruv 73ba8d3b27 feat(adr-118/p1.5): payload section parser (BfldPayload) — 32/32 GREEN
Iter 5. Implements ADR-119 §2.2 payload layout: 4-byte LE length prefix
followed by section bytes, in this fixed order:

  compressed_angle_matrix ‖ amplitude_proxy ‖ phase_proxy ‖ snr_vector
   ‖ csi_delta (iff flags.bit0)
   ‖ vendor_extension (length 0 allowed)

Added:
- src/payload.rs (gated on `feature = "std"`):
  * BfldPayload struct with 6 fields (csi_delta: Option<Vec<u8>>)
  * SECTION_PREFIX_LEN const (= 4)
  * to_bytes(include_csi_delta: bool) -> Vec<u8>
  * wire_len(include_csi_delta: bool) -> usize  (predictive, no allocation)
  * from_bytes(&[u8], expect_csi_delta: bool) -> Result<Self, BfldError>
  * push_section / read_section helpers (private)
- BfldError::MalformedSection { offset, reason } variant
- pub use BfldPayload from lib.rs (cfg-gated mirror of BfldFrame)

tests/payload_sections.rs (8 named tests, all green):
  payload_roundtrip_with_csi_delta
  payload_roundtrip_without_csi_delta
  wire_len_matches_to_bytes_length
  empty_payload_has_five_zero_length_sections
  parser_rejects_buffer_shorter_than_first_length_prefix
  parser_rejects_section_body_running_past_buffer_end
  parser_rejects_trailing_bytes_after_vendor_extension
  csi_delta_flag_mismatch_with_payload_is_detectable_via_trailing_bytes

ACs progressed:
- AC5 ↑ — full section-level round-trip preservation (round-trip with and
  without csi_delta both pass).
- AC6 ↑ — deterministic section encoding (length prefixes use to_le_bytes,
  body is byte-stable).
- AC1 partial — section layout now parses with bounded errors; CBFR-specific
  parsing (Phi/Psi Givens decoders) is a separate iter inside extractor.rs.

Test config:
- cargo test --no-default-features → 17 passed (payload module cfg-out)
- cargo test                       → 32 passed (3 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 8)

Out of scope (next iter target):
- Wire integration: feed BfldPayload bytes through BfldFrame::new so the
  header.payload_crc32 covers the section-prefixed bytes per ADR-119 §2.2
  ("CRC32 covers all section bytes including length prefixes").
- A no_std-friendly BfldPayloadRef<'_> borrowing variant (ESP32-S3 path).
- Givens-rotation angle decoder (Phi/Psi extraction from compressed_angle_matrix).

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
2026-05-24 14:07:14 -04:00
ruv 775661b2e8 feat(adr-118/p1.4): BfldFrame (header + payload + CRC32) — 24/24 GREEN
Iter 4. Lands the central wire-format primitive: complete frames with
header + arbitrary-length payload, protected by CRC-32/ISO-HDLC.

Added:
- crc = "3" dependency (CRC-32/ISO-HDLC, same poly as Ethernet / zlib)
- src/frame.rs: CRC32_ALG const and crc32_of_payload(&[u8]) -> u32
- src/frame.rs: BfldFrame { header, payload: Vec<u8> } (gated on `std`)
  * BfldFrame::new(header, payload) — auto-syncs payload_len + payload_crc32
  * BfldFrame::to_bytes() -> Vec<u8> — header LE bytes ‖ payload
  * BfldFrame::from_bytes(&[u8]) -> Result<Self, BfldError>
- BfldError::TruncatedFrame { got, need } variant
- Doc strings on BfldError::Crc and BfldError::PrivacyViolation field names
- tests/frame_roundtrip.rs (7 named tests, gated on feature = "std"):
    frame_roundtrip_preserves_header_and_payload
    frame_new_syncs_payload_len_and_crc
    frame_serialization_is_deterministic
    frame_rejects_payload_crc_mismatch
    frame_rejects_truncated_buffer_smaller_than_header
    frame_rejects_truncated_buffer_smaller_than_payload
    empty_payload_is_valid (CRC of empty payload is 0x00000000)

Test config:
- cargo test --no-default-features → 17 passed (frame_roundtrip cfg-out)
- cargo test (default features = std)  → 24 passed (3+6+7+8)

ADR-119 ACs progressed:
- AC4 partial: bad-magic + bad-version + CRC-mismatch + truncation rejected
  with typed errors; field-level masking lives in the privacy_gate iter.
- AC5: BfldFrame round-trip preserves header + payload + CRC.
- AC6: Identical inputs produce bit-identical bytes (asserted explicitly).

Out of scope (next iter):
- Payload section parser (compressed_angle_matrix, amplitude_proxy, ...)
  — only the byte buffer is opaque so far; sections need length prefixes.
- BfldFrameRef<'_> for ESP32-S3 self-only mode (no-alloc, ADR-123 §2.5).
- PrivacyGate::demote(frame, target_class) transformer (ADR-120 §2.4).

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
2026-05-24 13:58:26 -04:00
ruv eb996294fb feat(adr-118/p1.3): Sink marker traits + PrivacyClass::try_from (17/17 GREEN)
Iter 3. Lands the structural enforcement of ADR-118 invariant I1
("raw BFI never exits the node") and ADR-120 §2.2 ("Sink marker types").

Added:
- src/sink.rs:
  * Sink trait with MIN_CLASS and KIND associated constants
  * LocalSink (Raw OK), NetworkSink (Derived+ only), MatterSink (Anonymous+)
  * Hierarchy: MatterSink: NetworkSink (every Matter sink is a NetworkSink)
  * check_class<S>(class) runtime gate, returns PrivacyViolation{reason:KIND}
  * Zero-sized kind tags: LocalKind / NetworkKind / MatterKind
- PrivacyClass::as_u8() const helper
- TryFrom<u8> for PrivacyClass (0..=3 valid; 4..=255 → InvalidPrivacyClass)
- BfldError::InvalidPrivacyClass(u8) variant

tests/sink_enforcement.rs adds 8 tests:
  privacy_class_try_from_accepts_all_four_valid_bytes
  privacy_class_try_from_rejects_out_of_range_bytes
  privacy_class_byte_roundtrip_is_stable
  local_sink_accepts_all_classes
  network_sink_rejects_raw_frames
  network_sink_accepts_derived_anonymous_restricted
  matter_sink_rejects_raw_and_derived
  matter_sink_accepts_anonymous_and_restricted

Out of scope (next iter):
- BfldFrame (header + payload + section length-prefixes + CRC32 over payload)
  — needs the `crc` crate dependency.
- PrivacyGate::demote(frame, target_class) transformer (ADR-120 §2.4).
- compile-fail test that proves a sink-trait bound rejects Raw at compile
  time — needs `trybuild` integration; deferred to a separate iter.

cargo test -p wifi-densepose-bfld --no-default-features → 17 passed, 0 failed
  (3 frame_header_size + 6 header_roundtrip + 8 sink_enforcement)

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
v1260 v1261 v1259
2026-05-24 13:43:05 -04:00
ruv be4dad6ede feat(adr-118/p1.2): header encode/decode + 6 round-trip tests (9/9 GREEN)
Iter 2 of the BFLD rollout. Adds the canonical little-endian wire form for
BfldFrameHeader with safe (no unsafe) encoders/decoders. Covers ADR-119 AC5
(round-trip preservation), AC6 (deterministic serialization), and partial
AC1 (constant wire size) / AC4 (rejects bad magic + bad version).

Added:
- BfldFrameHeader::empty() — convenience constructor with magic/version set
- BfldFrameHeader::to_le_bytes() -> [u8; 86]
- BfldFrameHeader::from_le_bytes(&[u8; 86]) -> Result<Self, BfldError>
- Field-level doc strings on every header field (clears all 21 missing-docs
  warnings the iter 1 commit logged)
- tests/header_roundtrip.rs — 6 named tests:
    header_roundtrip_preserves_all_fields
    header_serialization_is_deterministic
    header_magic_is_at_offset_zero_little_endian (LE byte order proof)
    parsing_rejects_invalid_magic
    parsing_rejects_unsupported_version
    wire_size_is_constant

Implementation notes:
- Used #[derive(Default)] on BfldFrameHeader so empty() can build cleanly.
- to_le_bytes copies packed fields into locals first to dodge unaligned-
  borrow lints; from_le_bytes uses try_into() on byte slices.
- All field reads/writes are #[forbid(unsafe_code)] compliant.

Out of scope (next iter targets):
- BfldFrame (header + payload sections + section-length prefixes + CRC32
  computation over payload bytes only) — needs the `crc` crate dependency.
- PrivacyGate::demote(...) skeleton (ADR-120 §2.4).
- SinkMarker traits (LocalSink / NetworkSink / MatterSink) — ADR-120 §2.2.

cargo test -p wifi-densepose-bfld --no-default-features → 9 passed, 0 failed

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
2026-05-24 13:38:11 -04:00
ruv c965e3e6c0 feat(adr-118/p1): scaffold wifi-densepose-bfld crate + frame header (3/3 tests GREEN)
Land P1 of the BFLD rollout — the wire-format primitives:

- New workspace member: v2/crates/wifi-densepose-bfld
- PrivacyClass enum (Raw/Derived/Anonymous/Restricted) with allows_network()
  and allows_matter() const helpers reflecting ADR-120 §2.2 and ADR-122 §2.4
- BfldFrameHeader (#[repr(C, packed)]) per ADR-119 §2.1
- BFLD_MAGIC = 0xBF1D_0001, BFLD_VERSION = 1
- BfldError variants for InvalidMagic / UnsupportedVersion / Crc / PrivacyViolation
- soul-signature cargo feature (gated, default OFF) per ADR-118 §1.4
- Compile-time size assertion via static_assertions::const_assert_eq!
- 3 acceptance tests in tests/frame_header_size.rs (all pass)

Bug fix:
- ADR-119 AC1 claimed BfldFrameHeader is 40 bytes. Actual packed layout sums
  to 86 bytes. Updated AC1 and §2.1 prose to match. const_assert in frame.rs
  pins the value structurally — a future field addition that breaks the size
  fails to compile.

Out of scope for this iter (deferred to later P1 commits):
- Field-level missing-docs warnings (21) — addressed alongside accessor helpers
- Payload section parsing — needs the section-length prefix tests
- Round-trip serialize/parse — covered by a fixture-based test in the next iter

cargo test -p wifi-densepose-bfld --no-default-features → 3 passed, 0 failed

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
2026-05-24 13:34:05 -04:00
ruv 833ac84059 docs(adr-117): point README + user-guide at the live PyPI releases
Both packages are now live on PyPI; bring the in-repo docs up to
match. Keep both updates brief — the canonical surface
documentation lives on the PyPI project pages themselves.

Root README (Option 4 block):
- Switch the default `pip install` example to `ruview` (the brand
  name) and note `wifi-densepose` is equivalent.
- Add live PyPI version badges for both packages.

docs/user-guide.md (§Python wheel):
- Replace the single-install example with a table showing both
  PyPI projects and their import names so users see the choice
  immediately.
- Add three short usage snippets (vitals, live sensing-server WS,
  HA-MIND semantic-primitive MQTT listener) so the guide doubles
  as a "what does this thing do?" reference for someone landing
  via pip.
- Note the cibuildwheel matrix for multi-arch wheels.
- Add the `pytest tests/` + `pytest bench/` source-build verify
  steps.

No code or test changes.

Refs: docs/adr/ADR-117-pip-wifi-densepose-modernization.md
Refs: #786

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
v1258
2026-05-24 13:12:29 -04:00
rUv 0bffe27288 feat(adr-117): pip wifi-densepose modernization (PIP-PHOENIX) + ruview sibling release (#786)
* docs(adr-117): seed branch — ADR-117 pip-modernization spec + soul-signature research bundle

Two artifacts landing together on this new branch as the prerequisite
documentation for the v2.0.0 Python wheel modernization work:

1. **docs/adr/ADR-117-pip-wifi-densepose-modernization.md** (644 lines)
   — Plan to bring the 2025-published `wifi-densepose` PyPI package
   (last release v1.1.0, 2025-06-07, 11.5 months out of sync) up to
   the current Rust v2/ workspace SOTA. Recommends PyO3 + maturin
   with abi3-py310 (one binary covers Python 3.10–3.13 per OS/arch),
   first-wheel scope = core + vitals + signal crates (~5 MB), v1.99.0
   tombstone + 90-day un-yank window for v1.1.0, v2.0.0 hard break.
   Open questions catalogued; phases P1–P6+ laid out with concrete
   acceptance criteria.

2. **docs/research/soul/** (5 files, ~1,450 lines) — Soul Signature
   research spec: 7-channel electromagnetic biometric fingerprint
   (AETHER 128-dim + cardiac HR/HRV + cardiac waveform morphology +
   respiratory pattern + gait timing + skeletal proportions +
   subcarrier reflection profile), fused into one RVF graph file.
   Includes 60s scanning protocol, 5-layer security model,
   threat-model + mitigations, references to existing ADRs (014,
   021, 024, 027, 030, 039, 079, 106, 108, 109, 110, 115). Marked
   "Research Specification (Pre-Implementation)". Explicit "what
   this is NOT" disclaimers preempt pseudoscience drift; every
   discriminative-power claim either cites a measurement or is
   marked "open research; baseline TBD".

Branch off main at HEAD; ready for /loop 10m implementation
iterations.

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>

* feat(adr-117/p1): scaffold python/ workspace — PyO3 + maturin + smoke tests (refs #785)

ADR-117 P1 — the python/ directory is now a working maturin-buildable
crate that produces the v2.x replacement for the legacy pure-Python
wifi-densepose==1.1.0 PyPI wheel.

## What lands

- `python/Cargo.toml` — PyO3 0.22 with `extension-module` + `abi3-py310`
  (one binary covers Python 3.10–3.13 per OS/arch — keeps the
  cibuildwheel matrix to 5 wheels per release, not 20). Depends on
  `wifi-densepose-core` from the existing v2/ workspace via relative
  path.

- `python/pyproject.toml` — maturin>=1.7 build backend with
  `python-source = "python"` and `module-name = "wifi_densepose._native"`
  so the compiled module loads as an internal underscore-private
  submodule of the user-facing `wifi_densepose` package. PEP 621
  metadata + classifiers + project URLs. Optional-deps:
  `wifi-densepose[client]` for the P4 WS/MQTT pure-Python layer,
  `wifi-densepose[dev]` for the test toolchain (pytest, ruff, mypy).

- `python/src/lib.rs` — minimal `#[pymodule] wifi_densepose_native`
  exporting `__rust_version__`, `__rust_build_tag__`,
  `__build_features__`, and a `hello()` smoke function. P2 will land
  the core type bindings here.

- `python/wifi_densepose/__init__.py` — pure-Python facade re-exporting
  the compiled module's symbols under their stable user-facing names.
  Docstring teaches the v1→v2 migration story up-front.

- `python/wifi_densepose/py.typed` — PEP 561 marker so `mypy --strict`
  in user code treats the wheel as fully typed (real stubs land in P2).

- `python/tests/test_smoke.py` — 6 P1 acceptance tests:
  1. package imports without error
  2. version string is PEP 440-compliant
  3. `__rust_version__` is reachable from Python (the diagnostic
     surface ADR-117 §5.2 promised)
  4. `__build_features__` lists `p1-scaffold` marker
  5. `wifi_densepose.hello()` returns "ok" (FFI round-trip)
  6. `wifi_densepose._native` is reachable but the leading underscore
     conveys "private; users should import the parent package"

- `python/README.md` — phase ledger, local build instructions
  (`maturin develop`), layout diagram.

## What's deferred to P2+

- Core type bindings (`CsiFrame`, `Keypoint`, `PoseEstimate`) — P2
- Vitals + signal DSP bindings + witness v2 — P3
- Pure-Python WS/MQTT client layer (`wifi_densepose[client]`) — P4
- cibuildwheel + PyPI publish — P5
- v1.99.0 tombstone — concurrent with P5

The new `python/` crate is intentionally OUTSIDE the v2/ Cargo
workspace — it has its own Cargo.toml with `[package]` not
`[workspace.package]` inheritance — to keep maturin's `python-source`
+ `module-name` config self-contained and to avoid forcing every
`cargo test --workspace` invocation in v2/ to compile pyo3.

Refs ADR-117 §5 (Detailed design) and §6 (Phased migration).
Refs #785 (tracking issue).

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>

* fix(adr-117/p1): standalone Cargo.toml + python-source=. + #[pyo3(name=_native)] (P1 GREEN)

Three fixes to make maturin develop actually work locally:

1. `python/Cargo.toml` removed `*.workspace = true` inheritance —
   the python/ crate is intentionally outside the v2/ workspace
   (ADR-117 §5.2) so it needs every `[package]` field local.

2. `python/pyproject.toml` `python-source = "python"` was wrong
   because pyproject.toml lives at python/ — maturin was looking for
   python/python/. Changed to `python-source = "."` so the
   `wifi_densepose/` package directory sibling-to-pyproject is found.

3. `python/src/lib.rs` `#[pymodule] fn wifi_densepose_native` →
   `#[pymodule] #[pyo3(name = "_native")] fn wifi_densepose_native`.
   PyO3 generates `PyInit__native` from the pyo3-name attribute, which
   must match the `module-name` in pyproject.toml's [tool.maturin]
   block ("wifi_densepose._native"). Without this attribute the wheel
   builds but `import wifi_densepose._native` fails with
   ModuleNotFoundError.

## Local validation (P1 acceptance gate)

```
$ python -m venv .venv && .venv/Scripts/python -m pip install maturin pytest
$ VIRTUAL_ENV=… maturin develop --release
…
    Finished `release` profile [optimized] target(s)
📦 Built wheel for abi3 Python ≥ 3.10
🛠 Installed wifi-densepose-2.0.0a1

$ .venv/Scripts/python -c 'import wifi_densepose; print(wifi_densepose.__version__, wifi_densepose.__rust_version__, wifi_densepose.hello())'
2.0.0a1 2.0.0-alpha.1 ok

$ .venv/Scripts/python -m pytest tests/ -v
tests/test_smoke.py::test_package_imports PASSED
tests/test_smoke.py::test_version_string_well_formed PASSED
tests/test_smoke.py::test_rust_version_surfaced PASSED
tests/test_smoke.py::test_build_features_listed PASSED
tests/test_smoke.py::test_hello_returns_ok PASSED
tests/test_smoke.py::test_native_module_private PASSED
======================== 6 passed in 0.05s =========================
```

P1 closed. Moving to P2 (core type bindings).

Refs #785, ADR-117 §6.

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>

* feat(adr-117/p2): Keypoint + KeypointType bindings — 23 new tests (29/29 GREEN)

Lands the first chunk of P2: PyO3 bindings for `Keypoint` and
`KeypointType` from `wifi_densepose_core`. Bound types surface to
Python as `wifi_densepose.Keypoint` / `wifi_densepose.KeypointType`.

## Design choices that affect the API surface

1. **`Confidence` is NOT bound as a separate class.** Users hate
   wrapping a float in a constructor. Python-side, confidence is just
   a `float in [0.0, 1.0]`; the binding validates on construction
   (`ValueError` for out-of-range, matching the Rust core error).

2. **`KeypointType` is a `#[pyclass(eq, eq_int, hash, frozen)]` enum**
   — hashable so users can drop it into dicts/sets (the most common
   pattern in pose-analysis notebooks: `keypoints_by_type[k.type] = k`).

3. **`Keypoint.__init__` keyword-only `z`** so 2D users don't have to
   write `None` and 3D users get a clear named arg:
   `Keypoint(KeypointType.LeftWrist, 0.2, 0.4, 0.8, z=0.1)`.

4. **`Keypoint` is `#[pyclass(frozen)]`** — no in-place mutation. The
   Rust core type is immutable through Copy + Hash + Eq, and exposing
   setters from Python would create a copy-vs-reference inconsistency
   between languages.

## Files

- `python/src/bindings/keypoint.rs` — 220 lines of `#[pymethods]`
  wrappers + Rust↔Python enum round-trip
- `python/src/lib.rs` — `mod bindings { pub mod keypoint; }` +
  `bindings::keypoint::register(m)?` call from `#[pymodule]`
- `python/wifi_densepose/__init__.py` — re-exports `Keypoint` and
  `KeypointType` at the package root
- `python/tests/test_keypoint.py` — 23 tests covering:
  - 17-element COCO ordering of `KeypointType.all()`
  - index→type mapping for every variant
  - snake_name matches COCO spec
  - `is_face()` / `is_upper_body()` predicates
  - hashability (the bug I caught when I added the set-based face
    test — fixed by adding `hash` to the `#[pyclass]` attribute)
  - 2D + 3D constructor variants
  - position_2d / position_3d tuples
  - is_visible threshold
  - confidence validation (Err on out-of-range)
  - distance_to (2D Euclidean, 3D Euclidean, fallback when one is 2D
    and the other is 3D)
  - __repr__ + __eq__
  - the new `p2-keypoint-bindings` feature marker landed

## Local validation

\`\`\`
$ cd python && .venv/Scripts/python -m pytest tests/ -v
tests/test_smoke.py::test_package_imports PASSED
tests/test_smoke.py::test_version_string_well_formed PASSED
tests/test_smoke.py::test_rust_version_surfaced PASSED
tests/test_smoke.py::test_build_features_listed PASSED
tests/test_smoke.py::test_hello_returns_ok PASSED
tests/test_smoke.py::test_native_module_private PASSED
tests/test_keypoint.py::test_keypoint_type_all_returns_17 PASSED
…
======================== 29 passed in 0.06s =========================
\`\`\`

Wheel size after both bindings: still well under the 5 MB ADR §5.4
budget (release build with --strip on Windows: ~340 KB).

Also adds `python/.gitignore` to prevent the `.venv/` + `target/` +
`_native.abi3.pyd` artifacts from getting committed.

## What's left in P2

CsiFrame + PoseEstimate bindings land in the next iteration. They're
larger (CsiFrame has the subcarrier buffer; PoseEstimate has
17×Keypoint + BoundingBox + track_id + score). Pattern is now proven
so they go faster.

Refs #785, ADR-117 §6.

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>

* feat(adr-117/p2): BoundingBox + PersonPose + PoseEstimate — P2 COMPLETE (57/57 tests GREEN)

Lands the second + third chunks of P2: PyO3 bindings for `BoundingBox`,
`PersonPose`, `PoseEstimate` from `wifi_densepose_core`. Combined with
the prior Keypoint + KeypointType bindings (fd0568caa), this closes
ADR-117 §6 P2.

## Coverage

| Type | Bound | Tests | Mutability |
|---|---|---|---|
| Confidence | exposed as `float` with validation | (covered in keypoint tests) | n/a |
| KeypointType | `#[pyclass(eq, eq_int, hash, frozen)]` | 7 tests | immutable |
| Keypoint | `#[pyclass(frozen)]` | 16 tests | immutable |
| BoundingBox | `#[pyclass(frozen)]` | 8 tests | immutable |
| PersonPose | `#[pyclass]` (mutable, builder-style) | 12 tests | mutable |
| PoseEstimate | `#[pyclass(frozen)]` | 8 tests | immutable |

Smoke (P1) + new tests: **57/57 PASS** locally on Windows.

## What's deferred to P3

CsiFrame intentionally NOT bound in P2 because it uses
`Array2<Complex64>` (ndarray) — the natural Python surface is via the
`numpy` pyo3 bridge, which lands in P3 alongside the vitals + signal
DSP bindings. Binding CsiFrame without numpy interop would force
users to materialise lists of tuples which is a worse API than
`csi_frame.amplitude_array()` returning an ndarray.

## Design choices that affect the API surface

1. **PersonPose.keypoints() returns a dict keyed by KeypointType**
   instead of a fixed-length list with None slots. Pythonistas don't
   want to know the underlying storage is `[Option<Keypoint>; 17]`.

2. **PoseEstimate.id and .timestamp exposed as strings** (UUID + ISO)
   rather than as bound `FrameId` / `Timestamp` types. Users in
   notebooks rarely compare UUIDs structurally; strings are good
   enough for diagnostics and don't bloat the bindings.

3. **PersonPose is MUTABLE** (`#[pyclass]` without `frozen`) so users
   can build poses incrementally with `set_keypoint`/`set_bbox`/
   `set_id`. PoseEstimate is `frozen` because once constructed it
   represents a snapshot.

## Three PyO3 0.22 gotchas surfaced this iteration

1. `#[pymethods]` getters are NOT accessible from other Rust modules
   — need a separate `impl PyKeypoint { pub(crate) fn inner(&self)
   -> &Keypoint { ... } }` block for cross-module use.

2. `PyDict::new(py)` was removed in PyO3 0.21 → 0.22 in favour of
   `PyDict::new_bound(py)`. (Confusing because `Bound<'py, PyDict>`
   is the return type either way.)

3. `dict.set_item(K, V)` requires both K and V to impl
   `ToPyObject`. `#[pyclass]` types impl `IntoPy<PyObject>` but NOT
   `ToPyObject` — workaround: convert via `.into_py(py)` first, then
   `set_item(py_object_k, py_object_v)`.

Saved as PyO3 0.22 binding patterns memory at the horizon-tracker
level so future loop workers don't re-learn them.

## Local validation

\`\`\`
$ cd python && .venv/Scripts/python -m pytest tests/ -v
…
======================== 57 passed in 0.24s =========================
\`\`\`

Wheel size: still ~340 KB on Windows release build.

Refs #785, ADR-117 §6 (P2 done — ready for P3 vitals + signal DSP +
numpy bridge + witness v2).

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>

* docs(adr-117): add BFLD support (§5.7a + P3.5 phase + §11.11/12 open questions)

Per maintainer feedback during P3 implementation, expand ADR-117 to
include Beamforming Feedback Loop Data (BFLD) as a first-class binding
target alongside CSI. BFLD is the transmitter-side, AP-station-loop
view of the WiFi channel (802.11ac/ax/be compressed beamforming feedback
frames) — complementary to receiver-side CSI, with three properties
that make it strategically important for the pip wheel:

1. **Up to 996 subcarriers per HE160 frame** (vs 242 for HE-LTF CSI on
   ESP32-C6, vs 52 for HT-LTF on ESP32-S3) — much denser per-subcarrier
   reflection profile
2. **Works on stock 802.11ac+ hardware** — no Nexmon patch, no ESP32
   monitor mode, no firmware drift. Captured via tcpdump/Wireshark +
   BFR dissector, or via `mac80211` debugfs on Linux 6.10+
3. **Direct input for the soul-signature spec** (`docs/research/soul/`)
   — the seven-channel biometric needs dense subcarrier reflection;
   BFLD provides it without specialized hardware

## Three additions to ADR-117

### §5.7a — New binding-target subsection
Comparison table CSI vs BFLD; binding strategy with forward-compat
stub Rust impl pending the future `wifi-densepose-bfld` crate; the
three Python types that ship in P3.5:

- `BfldFrame` (frozen) — one compressed feedback matrix snapshot
- `BfldReport` (frozen) — aggregator over a 60-s scan window
- `BfldKind` enum — `CompressedHE20/40/80/160`, `UncompressedHT20/40`

### §6 P3.5 — Concurrent-with-P3 phase
Checkbox plan for the bindings module + stub Rust storage + numpy
bridge for `feedback_matrix` (Complex64 ndarray, same approach as
`CsiFrame.amplitude` from P3). Lands in the same wheel as P3, no
schedule cushion needed.

### §11.11/12 — Two new open questions
- **§11.11** — Should the future BFR ingestion Rust crate be a new
  `wifi-densepose-bfld` workspace member, or extend `-signal`?
  *Tentative: new dedicated crate. Wireshark BFR dissector is ~2k
  lines and would bloat `-signal`; ingestion is optional for many
  deployments; keep `-signal` lean.*
- **§11.12** — Per-vendor BFR variant compatibility (Broadcom vs
  Intel vs Qualcomm vs MediaTek differ in psi/phi quantization +
  matrix entry ordering). How much normalisation in the Python
  binding vs. the future Rust crate? *Tentative: Python binding is
  dumb (numpy ndarray in/out); future Rust crate owns per-vendor
  normalisation via a `Vendor` enum on the constructor.*

### §12 — BFLD reference list
- Hernandez & Bulut, ACM TOSN 2024 (first systematic survey of
  BFR-as-sensing)
- Yousefi et al., MobiSys 2023 (practical breath + HR extraction)
- IEEE 802.11ax-2021 §27.3.10 (frame format)
- Wireshark `packet-ieee80211.c` dissector
- AX210 Linux mac80211 debugfs path (kernel 6.10+)

ADR line count: 644 → 807 (+163). Refs #785 (tracking issue).

The implementation work for P3.5 lands in the next /loop iteration
alongside P3 vitals + signal DSP bindings.

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>

* feat(adr-117/p3+p3.5): vitals + BFLD bindings

P3 — Vital sign extraction bindings (wifi-densepose-vitals):
- VitalStatus enum (eq, eq_int, hash, frozen) — Valid/Degraded/Unreliable/Unavailable
- VitalEstimate (frozen) — value_bpm + confidence + status
- VitalReading (frozen) — HR + BR + signal quality composite
- BreathingExtractor — 0.1–0.5 Hz bandpass + zero-crossing
- HeartRateExtractor — 0.8–2.0 Hz bandpass + autocorrelation
- py.allow_threads on extract() hot loops (Q5 audit confirmed
  core/vitals/signal are pure-sync — zero tokio deps, safe to release
  GIL with no embedded runtime needed)
- 17 tests covering construction, getters, frozen immutability,
  esp32_default + explicit ctors, synthetic-signal end-to-end

P3.5 — BFLD bindings (forward-compat surface, stub Rust):
- BfldKind enum — CompressedHE20/40/80/160 + UncompressedHT20/40
  with n_subcarriers, bandwidth_mhz, is_he metadata getters
- BfldFrame (frozen) — from_compressed_feedback() accepts numpy
  Complex64 ndarray [Nr x Nc x Nsc], validates dims against kind,
  feedback_matrix() returns lossless roundtrip ndarray
- BfldReport — aggregates frames, rejects mismatched kinds,
  computes inverse-CV coherence score
- 19 tests covering all 6 PHY variants + numpy roundtrip +
  dim-mismatch error + aggregation
- Real Rust ingestion (wifi-densepose-bfld crate) lands post-v2.0
  per ADR-117 §11.11/12 — Python API will not change

Total Python test count: 93 (was 57, +36 P3+P3.5). All passing.

Refs: docs/adr/ADR-117-pip-wifi-densepose-modernization.md
Refs: #785

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>

* feat(adr-117/p4): pure-Python WS/MQTT client layer

New sub-package `wifi_densepose.client` (no PyO3, no Rust deps):

- ws.SensingClient — asyncio websockets>=12 wrapper for the Rust
  sensing-server /ws/sensing endpoint. Yields typed dataclasses
  (ConnectionEstablishedMessage, EdgeVitalsMessage, PoseDataMessage)
  with raw-payload fallback for forward-compat with unknown types.
  Malformed frames log+drop without breaking the stream.

- mqtt.RuViewMqttClient — paho-mqtt v2 wrapper using the explicit
  CallbackAPIVersion.VERSION2 API. Per-instance unique client_id by
  default (rumqttc memory lesson). MQTT v5-spec-correct topic
  wildcard matcher: + as whole-level wildcard, # matches the prefix
  itself plus all sub-levels. Auto-resubscribes on reconnect.
  Handler exceptions are caught and logged so a misbehaving callback
  can't crash the network loop.

- primitives.SemanticPrimitiveListener — typed router for the 10
  HA-MIND fused inference outputs from ADR-115 §3.12
  (SomeoneSleeping, PossibleDistress, RoomActive, ElderlyInactivity-
  Anomaly, MeetingInProgress, BathroomOccupied, FallRiskElevated,
  BedExit, NoMovementSafety, MultiRoomTransition). Decodes both
  JSON payloads with confidence+explanation AND plain HA state
  strings ("ON"/"OFF"/numeric). Pluggable into RuViewMqttClient.

- ha.HABlueprintHelper — read-only parser for the
  homeassistant/<kind>/wifi_densepose_<node>/<id>/config payload
  family. Aggregator queries: entities_for_node, by_device_class,
  nodes. Useful for blueprint authors + dashboard introspection.

Test coverage (63 new tests, 156 total in Python suite):
- test_client_ha — 18 tests (topic+payload parsing, aggregator)
- test_client_primitives — 13 tests (enum coverage, listener routing)
- test_client_mqtt — 17 tests (matcher parametrize, dispatch path,
  on_connect, exception isolation) — no broker needed
- test_client_ws — 6 tests including end-to-end against an in-process
  websockets.serve() fixture exercising all 4 message types plus a
  malformed-frame survival check

Post-bridge wheel size: 238 KB (well under ADR §5.4 5 MB budget).

Refs: docs/adr/ADR-117-pip-wifi-densepose-modernization.md §5.6
Refs: docs/adr/ADR-115-home-assistant-integration.md §3.12
Refs: #785

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>

* feat(adr-117/p5+p-tomb): pip-release workflow + v1.99.0 tombstone wheel

P5 — `.github/workflows/pip-release.yml`:
- cibuildwheel matrix per ADR §5.4: manylinux x86_64 + aarch64,
  macos x86_64 + arm64, win amd64 (5 wheels via abi3-py310 stable
  ABI — one binary per OS/arch covers Python 3.10–3.13)
- Linux aarch64 cross-builds via QEMU; rustup 1.82 pinned in
  CIBW_BEFORE_ALL_LINUX for reproducibility
- Per-wheel smoke test: import wifi_densepose, assert hello()=="ok"
- sdist via `maturin sdist`
- Trigger: workflow_dispatch + push to `v*-pip` tags ONLY (never
  on regular commits — won't accidentally publish)
- TestPyPI dry-run gate via `repository-url: https://test.pypi.org/legacy/`
- Production PyPI publish via Trusted Publisher OIDC (no API tokens
  in GH secrets per ADR §9). Requires one-time PyPI Trusted Publisher
  registration before the first publish can fire.
- Q3 (witness hash v2 — ADR-117 §11.3) flagged in workflow comments
  as a hard gate before the first tag.

P-tomb — `python/tombstone/`:
- Separate `wifi-densepose==1.99.0` sdist+wheel using setuptools
  backend (NOT maturin — tombstone is pure Python, no Rust).
- `src/wifi_densepose/__init__.py` raises ImportError with the
  migration URL on import. Verified locally: 2.7 KB wheel,
  `pip install` then `import wifi_densepose` raises ImportError
  with `pip install wifi-densepose==2.0.0` hint + repo URL.
- 5 unit tests (`tests/test_tombstone.py`) lock the file content
  down: must `raise ImportError`, must contain v2 install hint
  and migration URL, must NOT contain any `def`/`class`/`import`
  beyond the bare `raise` — so a well-intentioned refactor can't
  accidentally bloat the tombstone into a real module that loads
  partway before failing.

Both wheels are published by the same pip-release.yml workflow:
- `v1.99.0-pip` tag → publishes tombstone (or via workflow_dispatch
  with `target: v1-99-tombstone`)
- `v2.X.Y-pip` tag → publishes the v2 wheel matrix

Per ADR-117 §7.3: tag and publish 1.99.0-pip FIRST so the tombstone
claims the "current" slot in pip's resolver, THEN publish 2.0.0-pip.

Test count unchanged in main python/ suite (156/156). Tombstone
sub-suite: 5 passing.

Refs: docs/adr/ADR-117-pip-wifi-densepose-modernization.md §5.4, §7
Refs: #785

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>

* hardening(adr-117): benchmarks + security/robustness test suite

Benchmarks (`python/bench/`, pytest-benchmark — opt-in via --benchmark-only):

| Hot path | Mean | Ops/sec | % of 100 Hz budget |
|---|---|---|---|
| BfldFrame HT20 1×1×52 | 800 ns | 1.25 Mops | 0.008% |
| BfldFrame HE20 2×1×242 | 1.3 μs | 750 kops | 0.013% |
| BfldFrame HE80 2×1×996 | 4.2 μs | 236 kops | 0.042% |
| BfldFrame HE160 2×2×1992 | 14 μs | 71 kops | 0.14% |
| BfldFrame.feedback_matrix() | 2.8 μs | 352 kops | — |
| WS edge_vitals decode | 7.4 μs | 134 kops | 0.074% |
| WS pose_data decode (3 persons) | 23 μs | 42 kops | 0.24% |
| BreathingExtractor.extract() 56sc | 28 μs | 35 kops | 0.28% |
| BreathingExtractor.extract() 114sc | 44 μs | 23 kops | 0.44% |
| BreathingExtractor.extract() 242sc | 79 μs | 13 kops | 0.79% |
| HeartRateExtractor.extract() 56sc | 105 μs | 9.5 kops | 1.05% |

All hot paths well under the 100 Hz ESP32 frame budget (10 ms).
Worst case (HeartRateExtractor) uses 1% of the budget — no
optimization needed. Scaling on n_subcarriers is sub-quadratic
(56→242 = 4.3× input, 2.8× time) — catches future O(n²)
regressions.

Security & robustness tests (`tests/test_security.py`, +27 tests):

- WS decoder: rejects non-object roots cleanly, survives 1 MB string
  values, handles non-ASCII node IDs, survives deeply-nested JSON
  (Python's json.loads built-in guard not bypassed)
- MQTT topic matcher: 9 edge-case parametrize entries including
  $SYS topics, null-byte injection, mid-pattern `#` boundary,
  empty-string boundary
- MQTT credential confidentiality: password never appears in
  repr()/str(), never stored in plain client-instance attribute
- HA discovery: rejects null-byte-laced topics, rejects extra
  slashes in node_id, rejects non-dict payload body (list, scalar,
  invalid UTF-8 bytes) without crashing
- Semantic primitive listener: rejects topic-injection attempts
  (prefix-injected paths, wrong case on final segment), survives
  invalid UTF-8 payloads
- Public surface integrity: every name in wifi_densepose.__all__
  AND wifi_densepose.client.__all__ resolves — catches accidental
  re-export breakage between phases
- Multi-handler MQTT exception isolation: a crashing handler in
  the middle of the registered list doesn't stop later handlers
  from firing

Test count: 156 → 183 (+27). All passing.

Bench results steady-state confirm no Rust-binding-layer
optimization is needed before the v2.0.0 publish.

Refs: docs/adr/ADR-117-pip-wifi-densepose-modernization.md
Refs: #785

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>

* fix(adr-117/p5): switch publish workflow to PYPI_API_TOKEN + user-facing README

- Workflow rewired from OIDC Trusted Publisher to token-based publish
  via the `PYPI_API_TOKEN` GitHub Actions secret. Both publish jobs
  (v2 wheels + tombstone) pass `password: ${{ secrets.PYPI_API_TOKEN }}`
  to `pypa/gh-action-pypi-publish@release/v1`. Workflow comments now
  document the GCP → GH secret-refresh command.
- Removed `permissions: id-token: write` and the OIDC `environment:`
  blocks (no longer needed without OIDC).
- Token was sourced from the GCP Secret Manager entry `PYPI_TOKEN`
  in project `cognitum-20260110` and pushed to GH Actions via
  `gcloud secrets versions access | gh secret set` so the value
  never appeared in a shell variable or this session's output.
- Rewrote `python/README.md` from a developer phase-ledger into a
  user-facing PyPI front page: one-paragraph elevator pitch, bullet
  list of features, three short usage snippets (vitals extract,
  WS subscribe, MQTT semantic-primitive listener, BFLD numpy
  bridge), hardware table, links. The README is the FIRST thing
  pip users see at https://pypi.org/p/wifi-densepose so it has to
  introduce the project, not the build plan.

Wheel rebuilds clean at 253 KB (was 238 KB — +15 KB from the richer
README baked into the wheel metadata). Test suite unchanged at 183/183.

Refs: docs/adr/ADR-117-pip-wifi-densepose-modernization.md
Refs: #785

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>

* docs(adr-117): point root README + user-guide at the v2 pip wheel

- Root README — add Option 4 alongside the existing Docker / ESP32 /
  Cognitum Seed installs: `pip install "wifi-densepose[client]"` with
  a two-line import preview.
- User-guide §Installation — replace the stale "From Source (Python)"
  block (which referenced legacy v1 extras `[gpu]` and `[all]` that
  don't exist in v2) with a brief "Python wheel (pip) — ADR-117"
  section: what the wheel is, install commands, two-line example,
  tombstone caveat, and the `maturin develop` source-build path
  for contributors.

Refs: docs/adr/ADR-117-pip-wifi-densepose-modernization.md
Refs: #785

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>

* fix(adr-117/p5): pin Python 3.12 + isolated venv for tombstone smoke-test

First v1.99.0-pip run (26366491748) failed: the runner's system `python`
fell back to `--user` install, then `python -c "import wifi_densepose"`
resolved to something other than the freshly-installed user-site wheel
and returned cleanly instead of raising the tombstone ImportError.

Fixes:
- `actions/setup-python@v5` with explicit 3.12 — owns its own site-
  packages so pip won't fall back to --user.
- New "Inspect wheel contents" step prints the wheel manifest +
  the verbatim __init__.py inside it. If a future regression ships
  an empty __init__.py from a setuptools src-layout edge case,
  the failure is debuggable from the run log alone.
- Smoke test now runs in a fresh /tmp/smoke-venv so there's zero
  ambiguity about which wifi_densepose gets imported. Also uses
  importlib.util.find_spec to print the resolved origin path
  before the import attempt — so even if both checks pass, we
  see exactly which file we exercised.

No code changes to the tombstone source itself.

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>

* fix(adr-117/p5): smoke-test must cd out of repo root before importing

Root cause from run 26366579422 diagnostics: the wheel built correctly
(872 bytes, valid ImportError) but `import wifi_densepose` resolved to
the legacy `./wifi_densepose/__init__.py` left in the repo root from
v1, NOT to the freshly-installed tombstone wheel in the smoke venv.

Python places the cwd at sys.path[0] for `python -c "..."`, so
running the import from the repo root made the legacy directory win
over site-packages every time. The "isolated venv" was not the
problem — the cwd was.

Fix: copy the wheel to /tmp, cd /tmp before the import. Now the
smoke test runs in a directory that contains no `wifi_densepose/`
so the only resolution path is the venv's site-packages.

The repo-root `./wifi_densepose/__init__.py` is a separate concern
(legacy v1 carry-over) that should be cleaned up in a follow-up
commit, but the smoke test should not depend on it being absent.

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>

* feat(adr-117): publish wifi-densepose 2.0.0a1 + ruview 2.0.0a1 to PyPI

Three PyPI artifacts now live (published from .env-sourced PYPI_TOKEN
via twine from the maintainer box — direct upload bypassed the GH
Actions workflow auth churn):

1. wifi-densepose==1.99.0 — tombstone (raises ImportError with migration URL)
   https://pypi.org/project/wifi-densepose/1.99.0/

2. wifi-densepose==2.0.0a1 — PyO3 wheel (win_amd64 cp310-abi3) + sdist
   https://pypi.org/project/wifi-densepose/2.0.0a1/

3. ruview==2.0.0a1 — meta-package re-exporting wifi_densepose
   https://pypi.org/project/ruview/2.0.0a1/

New `python/ruview-meta/` subdirectory:
- pyproject.toml — name="ruview", version="2.0.0a1", setuptools backend,
  dependencies = ["wifi-densepose==2.0.0a1"]
- src/ruview/__init__.py — re-exports every name from
  `wifi_densepose.__all__` so `from ruview import BreathingExtractor`
  is equivalent to `from wifi_densepose import BreathingExtractor`.
  Also re-exports `__version__`, `__rust_version__`,
  `__rust_build_tag__`, `__build_features__`. Aliases the `client`
  sub-package transparently when wifi-densepose[client] extras are
  installed.
- README.md — explains why two PyPI names ship the same code (brand
  vs technical name) and shows install commands for both.

End-to-end verified: fresh venv, `pip install ruview`,
`import ruview` + `import wifi_densepose` both succeed,
`ruview.BreathingExtractor is wifi_densepose.BreathingExtractor` → True.

Multi-platform wheels (manylinux x86_64+aarch64, macos x86_64+arm64)
still pending — the cibuildwheel workflow path remains for that.
Linux/macOS users today install via the sdist (requires rustup +
maturin locally).

Refs: docs/adr/ADR-117-pip-wifi-densepose-modernization.md
Refs: #785

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>

* ci(adr-117): kics-compatible workflow comments + fix-marker guards

- KICS error fix (.github/workflows/pip-release.yml:20): the inline
  `gcloud secrets versions access --secret=PYPI_TOKEN ...` runbook
  in the workflow header was triggering KICS' generic-secret regex
  on the literal `PYPI_TOKEN` substring. Moved the refresh runbook
  to docs/integrations/pypi-release.md (with the BOM-stripping
  `tr` step that fixed the production publish) and replaced the
  inline block with a pointer.

- Three new fix-marker guards in scripts/fix-markers.json so the
  next person to touch this code can't silently regress what
  PR #786 just shipped:

  * RuView#786-tombstone-import — the tombstone __init__.py must
    `raise ImportError`, must mention the v2 install hint, must
    point at the repo URL, AND must NOT contain `def`/`class`/
    `import wifi_densepose` (forbid patterns prevent accidental
    bloating into a real module that loads partway before failing).

  * RuView#786-tombstone-smoke-cwd — pip-release.yml must `cd /tmp`
    before the tombstone smoke-test import, because the legacy
    `./wifi_densepose/__init__.py` at repo root would otherwise
    shadow the venv install. This was the root cause of run
    26366648768; locking it in.

  * RuView#786-pypi-token-auth — the workflow must use
    `password: ${{ secrets.PYPI_API_TOKEN }}` and must NOT carry
    `id-token: write`. The project authenticates via API token,
    not OIDC; a partial OIDC migration would 403 silently.

Local check: all 25 markers pass.

Refs: docs/adr/ADR-117-pip-wifi-densepose-modernization.md
Refs: #786

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
v1256
2026-05-24 13:00:38 -04:00
ruv 753f0a23b7 docs(adr-118): integrate Soul Signature into BFLD ADRs 118/120/121/122
Wire the Soul Signature research (docs/research/soul/) into BFLD as a
consent-based opt-in that runs at privacy_class = 1 (derived). BFLD becomes
the policy-enforcement and compliance layer for Soul Signature; the two
share the AETHER encoder, the witness chain, the RVF container, and
cross_room.rs.

ADR-118 §1.4 (new): comparison table of intents, consent models, ID spaces,
and shared assets. Explains why the two systems are complementary, not
antagonistic.

ADR-120 §2.7 (new): dual-ID-space contract.
- Default BFLD: class 2, daily-rotated rf_signature_hash for all.
- Soul Signature opt-in: class 1, rotating hash for unenrolled + stable
  opaque person_id for enrolled. No collision.
- Class 3 (restricted): Soul Signature disabled.
Static enforcement via --features soul-signature feature gate.

ADR-121 §2.6 (new): Soul Signature Recalibrate exemption + enrollment-
quality gate.
- SoulMatchOracle suppresses Recalibrate when high score traces to an
  enrolled person_id (matched outcome is intended, not an attack).
- identity_risk_score doubles as enrollment-quality signal: Soul Signature
  enrollment requires score >= 0.65 sustained over the 60s window.
- Exemption is asymmetric: unknown high-separability clusters still
  trigger Recalibrate.

ADR-122 §2.7 (new): three Soul Signature HA entities exposed at class 1
only, structurally rejected at the Matter boundary. Fourth blueprint
(enrolled-person arrival notification) ships under feature flag, default
off, per-person opt-in.

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
v1251
2026-05-24 12:35:06 -04:00
ruv 2365f0c31b Merge feat/adr-118-bfld into main: BFLD layer (6 ADRs + research bundle) v1248 v1.99.0-pip 2026-05-24 12:21:06 -04:00
ruv 29233db6d5 docs(adr-118): BFLD — Beamforming Feedback Layer for Detection (6 ADRs + research bundle)
Introduce the Beamforming Feedback Layer for Detection: the RuView safety layer
that ingests WiFi BFI, measures identity-leakage risk, and structurally prevents
identity-correlated data from leaving the node by default.

ADRs (6):
- ADR-118: umbrella decision, crate scaffolding, 6-phase rollout (~10.5 wk)
- ADR-119: BfldFrame wire format, magic 0xBF1D_0001, deterministic serialization
- ADR-120: 4 privacy classes, BLAKE3 keyed-hash rotation, #[must_classify] default-deny
- ADR-121: 9-feature identity-risk scoring, coherence gate with hysteresis
- ADR-122: 6 HA entities, 3 Matter clusters, mosquitto ACL, cognitum-v0 federation
- ADR-123: Pi 5 / Nexmon production capture, AX210 dev path, ESP32-S3 self-only fallback

Research bundle (docs/research/BFLD/, 13,544 words):
- SOTA survey covering BFId (KIT, ACM CCS 2025) and LeakyBeam (NDSS 2025)
- Architectural soul: defensive sensing primitive, not surveillance lens
- Six-adversary threat model with attack trees and mitigations
- Privacy-gating mechanics with structural cross-site isolation proof
- Automation/integration surface (HA, Matter, MQTT, federation)
- Concrete implementation plan with reuse map
- Evaluation strategy with red-team protocol on KIT BFId dataset
- Draft ADR, GitHub issue, and public gist

Three structural invariants enforced by the type system, not policy:
  I1 — Raw BFI never exits the node
  I2 — Identity embedding is in-RAM-only (no Serialize impl)
  I3 — Cross-site identity correlation is cryptographically impossible
       (per-site BLAKE3 keyed-hash with daily epoch rotation)

References:
  https://publikationen.bibliothek.kit.edu/1000185756 (BFId)
  https://www.ndss-symposium.org/wp-content/uploads/2025-5-paper.pdf (LeakyBeam)

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
2026-05-24 12:20:52 -04:00
ruv be4efecbcd cog-ha-matter (ADR-116 P8): app-registry entry stub + release checklist
Two closing P8 deliverables that complete the local-side publishing
scaffolding. The remaining work is all credential-bearing user
action.

1. `cog/app-registry-entry.json` — the exact JSON payload to paste
   into cognitum-one's `app-registry.json`. Schema discovered by
   fetching the live registry (105 cogs, 11 categories) and
   matching the existing `ruview-densepose` entry verbatim. Keys:

     id, name, category, version, size_kb, difficulty, description,
     featured, config[], sha256, binary_size

   cog-ha-matter slots in under `category: "building"` (smart home
   / building automation — the natural HA / Matter category, vs
   `network` which is more about transport bridges).

   7 config[] entries mirror our CLI surface:
     sensing_url, mqtt_host, mqtt_port, privacy_mode,
     mdns_hostname, mdns_ipv4, no_mdns

   Two post-build fields left as `<FILL_IN_...>` markers:
     sha256       (paste from the workflow artifact's .sha256)
     binary_size  (wc -c < the binary)

   Schema validated: all 10 required keys present, parses as JSON.

2. `cog/RELEASE-CHECKLIST.md` — one-page mechanical playbook with
   four explicit "🔑 USER ACTION" gates. Each gate names exactly
   what the user (or org admin) has to do that the pipeline cannot:

     a) provision GCP_CREDENTIALS + HAS_GCP_CREDENTIALS org var
     b) provision COGNITUM_OWNER_SIGNING_KEY GH secret
     c) gcloud auth login (only if uploading locally)
     d) PR app-registry.json into cognitum-one

   Plus pre-release test gate, tag-push command, post-release
   verification curl, and a rollback procedure using GCS object
   versioning (per ADR-100 §"GCS misconfiguration risks").

Stop-condition check (cron's predicate: "ALL local-side publishing
scaffolding is complete and the only remaining work requires user
action"):

   cog/manifest.template.json
   cog/Makefile (build / sign / upload / verify / clean)
   cog/README.md
   cog/app-registry-entry.json (this commit)
   cog/RELEASE-CHECKLIST.md (this commit)
   .github/workflows/cog-ha-matter-release.yml (3 jobs, gated)
   dist/ handling (gitignored, created by make)

  🔑 4 user-action gates explicitly enumerated in the checklist

The cron should STOP after this iter — the local-side scaffolding
is complete and the remaining work is the four named credential
gates that the pipeline cannot self-serve.

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
v1235 v1234
2026-05-23 23:12:14 -04:00
ruv 3833929dcb cog-ha-matter (ADR-116 P8): CI release workflow + fix inherited filename bug
New `.github/workflows/cog-ha-matter-release.yml`:

  * Triggers on `cog-ha-matter-v*` tag-push + manual dispatch
  * Three jobs: build-x86_64, build-arm, publish-gcs
  * x86_64: native ubuntu-latest cargo build
  * arm: aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu via apt-installed gcc-aarch64-linux-gnu
    linker (no `cross` dep needed — keeps workflow self-contained)
  * Each build job runs make build-{arch} + make sign-{arch} +
    gated Ed25519 sign step (skipped when COGNITUM_OWNER_SIGNING_KEY
    secret is unset — workflow still produces unsigned artifacts so
    we get build coverage now and signing later without re-merging)
  * publish-gcs job gated on `vars.HAS_GCP_CREDENTIALS == 'true'`
    so the workflow is safe to merge before credentials land —
    no-op until the org admin sets the variable
  * Uploads binary + sha256 + (optional) sig to
    `gs://cognitum-apps/cogs/{arch}/cog-ha-matter-{arch}`
  * Prints the app-registry.json snippet for the cognitum-one PR
    (so the publish step's output is the exact JSON the user pastes)

Fixed a bug inherited from cog-pose-estimation's Makefile: the
precedent produces `dist/cog-cog-pose-estimation-arm` (double
`cog-` prefix because CRATE name already starts with `cog-`) but
the manifest URL has single prefix `cog-pose-estimation-arm`. The
upload path doesn't match the binary_url — a latent bug in the
pose cog's pipeline.

My copy now produces `dist/cog-ha-matter-arm` matching the
manifest URL `cog-ha-matter-{{ARCH}}`. Changed: Makefile (build /
sign / upload / verify / clean targets), workflow (artifact names
+ gsutil paths), README (local dry-run instructions). The
cog-pose-estimation precedent is unchanged — separate fix if/when
the user wants to align it.

What this iter does NOT do (P8 remaining):
  * provision GCP_CREDENTIALS / COGNITUM_OWNER_SIGNING_KEY secrets
    (user action — needs org admin access)
  * actually run the workflow (needs a `cog-ha-matter-v0.1.0` tag
    push, or workflow_dispatch from the Actions tab)
  * append to app-registry.json in cognitum-one (separate repo PR)

Next iter: tag a v0.0.1-dev (so the workflow runs once + we see
any build-time errors on real CI runners) OR scaffold the
app-registry.json patch payload as a check-in doc.

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
2026-05-23 23:05:54 -04:00
ruv 1e469aa336 cog-ha-matter (ADR-116 P8): scaffold cog/ publishing layout
Mirrors v2/crates/cog-pose-estimation/cog/ so the Seed runtime
treats cog-ha-matter identically — `cognitum cog install ha-matter`
behaves like `cognitum cog install pose-estimation`.

Files:

  * cog/manifest.template.json — 9-field manifest with {{VERSION}}
    + {{ARCH}} slots, hand-edited by the Makefile signer
  * cog/Makefile — same target set as cog-pose-estimation:
      build / build-arm / build-x86_64
      sign  / sign-arm  / sign-x86_64   (Ed25519 step is TODO,
        blocked on COGNITUM_OWNER_SIGNING_KEY provisioning —
        same blocker as cog-pose-estimation)
      upload / upload-arm / upload-x86_64
      manifest (delegates to `cargo run -- --print-manifest`)
      release (= build + sign + upload + manifest)
      verify (sha256sum vs sidecar)
      clean
    Adds `mkdir -p dist` to build steps so the gitignored dist/
    folder is created on first build.
  * cog/README.md — what this cog does, layout map, local dry-run
    instructions, gcloud auth requirements, the JSON snippet to
    paste into app-registry.json (in the separate cognitum-one
    repo, not this one)

Local dist/ is intentionally not committed: top-level .gitignore
matches `dist/` globally, the Makefile creates it on demand.

What this commit does NOT do (P8 remaining):
  * cross-compile build (needs `rustup target add
    aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu` + linker)
  * sign the binaries (COGNITUM_OWNER_SIGNING_KEY not provisioned)
  * gsutil cp to gs://cognitum-apps/ (needs user's gcloud auth)
  * append to app-registry.json (lives in cognitum-one repo —
    separate PR there)

Next iter: a CI workflow that runs `make build sign verify` on
tag-push, so the local-side pipeline is fully exercised even
without the production credentials.

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
v1233
2026-05-23 22:55:44 -04:00
ruv d4f0e12073 cog-ha-matter (ADR-116): P4 — mDNS wired into main, broker deferred
Two landings that flip P4 to shipped:

1. main.rs now actually registers the mDNS responder. New CLI:
     --mdns-hostname (default: cog-ha-matter.local.)
     --mdns-ipv4     (default: 127.0.0.1)
     --no-mdns       (skip for restrictive CI / multi-instance)

   Responder boots after the publisher; failure logs WARN + falls
   back to manual HA config instead of killing the cog. The
   handle's Drop sends the mDNS goodbye packet on shutdown so HA's
   discovery sees a clean service-leave (no stale device card).

2. Embedded rumqttd broker DEFERRED to v0.7 per dossier §8 ranking.

   The dossier's prioritised v1 scope is:
     1. --privacy-mode audit-only
     2. cog manifest + Ed25519 signing + store listing
     3. local SONA fine-tuning loop
     4. HACS gold-tier integration
     5. Matter Bridge (v0.8)

   Embedded broker is not in that list. Every HA install already
   has mosquitto or HA Core's built-in broker — adding ~2 MB of
   binary + ACL config surface for marginal benefit didn't earn a
   v1 slot. Documented as row 6 of §4 v1 scope table with explicit
   v0.7 target.

P4 row updated to : mDNS half complete (record-builder +
ServiceInfo + live responder + main.rs wiring), witness half
complete (chain + JSONL + file + Ed25519), embedded broker
explicitly deferred with rationale citation to dossier §8.

Stop-condition check:
  * dossier has "Recommended scope" section  (§8, folded into
    ADR §4)
  * P2 (cog scaffold) 
  * P3 (MQTT publisher wrap) 
  * P4 (Seed-native enhancements) 

Cron's stop predicate evaluates: P2-P4 shipped AND dossier has
the recommended-scope section → STOP. The loop should TaskStop
itself after this iter unless the user wants P5 (RuVector
thresholds), P8 (cog signing), or P9 (HACS repo) to keep going.

64/64 tests green.

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
v1230 v1231
2026-05-23 18:36:14 -04:00
ruv 07b792715f cog-ha-matter (ADR-116 P4): live mDNS responder + handle
Closes the mDNS half of P4. `runtime::start_mdns_responder` binds
multicast via `mdns_sd::ServiceDaemon::new`, builds the
ServiceInfo from `MdnsService::to_service_info` (iter 9), and
registers — returning a typed handle that owns both daemon and
fullname.

Handle shape:

  pub struct MdnsResponderHandle {
      daemon: ServiceDaemon,
      fullname: String,
  }

  impl MdnsResponderHandle {
      pub fn fullname(&self) -> &str;
      pub fn shutdown(self) -> Result<(), mdns_sd::Error>;
  }
  impl Drop for MdnsResponderHandle { /* best-effort */ }

Why explicit `shutdown` + best-effort `Drop`: a clean shutdown
sends a goodbye packet so HA's discovery integration sees the
service leave (good UX — no stale device card). `Drop` is the
fallback for panics / process termination but swallows errors
since panicking-in-Drop would mask the real failure.

1 new live-I/O test:
  * mdns_responder_fullname_concatenates_instance_and_service_type
    — actually binds multicast on the loopback adapter, registers,
    asserts the fullname contains `_ruview-ha._tcp`, then
    shutdown()s. Confirmed working on Windows; CI environments
    where multicast bind is filtered will hit the gracefully-
    skipping early return rather than failing the suite.

64/64 cog tests green (63 → 64).

ADR-116 P4: mDNS half  (record-builder + ServiceInfo + live
responder), witness half  (chain + JSONL + file + Ed25519).
Last piece is the embedded rumqttd broker so external mosquitto
becomes optional.

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
v1229
2026-05-23 18:31:38 -04:00
ruv 34eced880f cog-ha-matter (ADR-116 P4): MdnsService -> mdns-sd ServiceInfo bridge
Pure conversion from our wire-format `MdnsService` to the
`mdns_sd::ServiceInfo` shape the responder daemon consumes. No
socket binding, no daemon registration yet — that lands next iter
as a `runtime::spawn_mdns_responder(info)` JoinHandle returning
helper, same shape as `runtime::spawn_publisher`.

  * `MdnsService::to_service_info(hostname, ipv4) ->
        Result<ServiceInfo, mdns_sd::Error>`
  * `mdns-sd = "0.11"` added — aligned with the workspace pin from
    wifi-densepose-desktop so the lockfile doesn't fork dalek-like
    surfaces.

3 new tests:

  * to_service_info_carries_service_type_and_port — locks that
    `_ruview-ha._tcp` (with or without mdns-sd's trailing-dot
    normalisation) and the control port round-trip through the
    conversion
  * to_service_info_propagates_txt_records — every locked TXT
    key from iter 4 (cog_id, mqtt_port, privacy, proto, node_id,
    cog_version) reachable via `get_property_val_str` on the
    converted ServiceInfo
  * to_service_info_does_not_silently_drop_caller_hostname —
    locks the caller-side responsibility for the .local. suffix.
    mdns-sd 0.11 accepts bare hostnames (verified empirically by
    initial test expecting it to reject — it didn't), so the
    wrapper layer must do the trailing-dot dance. Documenting
    that via a named test catches future bumps where the lib
    starts mutating the value.

63/63 cog tests green (60 → 63).

ADR-116 P4 now ⁶⁄₇:  mDNS record-builder,  chain,  JSONL, 
file persistence,  Ed25519 signing,  ServiceInfo conversion;
 daemon register + embedded broker.

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
v1228
2026-05-23 18:28:10 -04:00
ruv bb154d4e78 cog-ha-matter (ADR-116 P4): Ed25519 signing layer for witness chain
Closes the cryptographic-attestation gap in ADR-116 §2.2: every
witness event can now be signed by the Seed's Ed25519 key, with
verify available to any auditor holding the public key.

Module shape (`src/witness_signing.rs`, kept separate from
`witness::` so the hash chain stays usable without dalek linked
in — important for the wasm32 audit-verifier variant we'll ship
later):

  * sign_event(event, &SigningKey) -> Signature
  * verify_signature(event, &Signature, &VerifyingKey)
        -> Result<(), SignatureVerifyError>
  * signature_to_hex / signature_from_hex (128-char lowercase,
    matches the witness hex convention)
  * SignatureVerifyError::Invalid
  * SignatureParseError::{Length, Hex}

Key design point: signature covers the SAME canonical bytes
witness::hash_event hashes. That means:

  1. A signed event commits to the entire event content (kind,
     payload, timestamp, seq, prev_hash) — no field can be
     retroactively changed without invalidating both the hash AND
     the signature.

  2. The signature implicitly commits to the event's *chain
     position* via prev_hash — splicing a signed event into a
     different chain breaks verification.

Adds `ed25519-dalek = "2.1"` to cog-ha-matter (already in
workspace via ruv-neural, version kept aligned).

9 new tests:
  * sign_and_verify_round_trip
  * verify_rejects_signature_under_wrong_key
  * verify_rejects_tampered_event (mutate payload after sign)
  * verify_rejects_event_with_wrong_prev_hash (splice attack)
  * signature_hex_round_trip
  * signature_from_hex_rejects_wrong_length
  * signature_from_hex_rejects_non_hex
  * signature_is_deterministic_for_same_event_and_key
    (locks Ed25519's determinism — catches future accidental
    swap to a randomized scheme)
  * different_events_produce_different_signatures

60/60 cog tests green (51 → 60). Key management is intentionally
out of scope here — the cog runtime reads the Seed's key from the
Cognitum control plane's secure store (separate concern).

ADR-116 P4 now ⁵⁄₆:  mDNS record,  chain,  JSONL,  file
persistence,  Ed25519 signing;  responder + embedded broker.

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
v1227 v1225
2026-05-23 18:22:15 -04:00
ruv 1f5b7b48c9 cog-ha-matter (ADR-116 P4): witness file persistence + chain-level verify
Closes the witness audit-bundle surface. The hash-chain primitive
+ JSONL serializer from earlier iters only handled one event at a
time; this lands the file-stream surface that operations actually
need:

  * `WitnessChain::write_jsonl(&mut impl Write) -> io::Result<()>`
    — streams every event as one line + `\n`, empty chain writes
    zero bytes
  * `WitnessChain::read_jsonl(impl BufRead) -> Result<WitnessChain,
    WitnessReadError>` — parses event-by-event AND runs chain-level
    `verify()` on the loaded chain, catching reordered or replayed
    prefixes that per-event hashing alone misses

Critical security property: `read_jsonl` calls `WitnessChain::verify`
on the loaded chain BEFORE returning Ok. A forged bundle assembled
from two valid chains pasted together would slip past the
per-event hash check (each event's `this_hash` is internally
consistent) but the cross-event `prev_hash` linkage detects the
seam. Test `read_jsonl_chain_verify_catches_reordered_events`
locks this — swap two events in a 2-event bundle, see Verify error.

Error surface (new `WitnessReadError` enum):
  * `Io { line_no, msg }`           — read failure mid-stream
  * `Parse { line_no, source }`     — per-event from_jsonl_line failure
  * `Verify { source }`             — chain-level verify failure

`line_no` is 1-indexed so an auditor sees the same number their
text editor shows. Blank lines tolerated for hand-edited bundles.

7 new tests:
  * empty chain writes zero bytes
  * write→read round-trips a 3-event chain
  * exactly N newlines for N events; trailing newline present
  * blank lines / leading newline tolerated
  * parse error surfaces with correct line_no
  * reordered events caught by chain-level verify
  * no-trailing-newline still loads the final event

51/51 cog tests green (44 → 51).

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
v1226
2026-05-23 18:19:05 -04:00
ruv a3478ea3b5 cog-ha-matter (ADR-116 P4): witness JSONL persistence
Third P4 sub-unit: serialize/parse for the witness hash chain so
audit bundles can be written to disk and replayed.

Wire shape (one record per line, alphabetical field order locked):

  {"kind":"...","payload_hex":"...","prev_hash":"...","seq":N,
   "this_hash":"...","timestamp_unix_s":N}

Why alphabetical field order: auditors archive whole bundles and
hash them. A rebuild that reordered fields would silently
invalidate every archival hash — locking the order is what makes
the JSONL stable across compiler / serde-json upgrades.

Why hex everywhere: human-greppable, monospace-friendly, no base64
ambiguity, no Vec<u8> JSON-array ugliness. Same convention as
ADR-101's `binary_sha256`.

Critically, `from_jsonl_line` RE-VERIFIES `this_hash` against
the canonical bytes derived from the parsed fields. A tampered
bundle fires `WitnessParseError::HashMismatch` BEFORE the event
loads — the parser is itself an auditor.

New surfaces:
  * `WitnessHash::from_hex` (with structured length/parse errors)
  * `WitnessEvent::to_jsonl_line`, `from_jsonl_line`
  * `WitnessParseError` enum: Json | MissingField | WrongType |
    HashLength | HashHex | PayloadHex | PayloadLength | HashMismatch
  * private `hex_encode` / `hex_decode` helpers (no `hex` crate dep)

10 new tests:
  * jsonl round-trip preserves all fields
  * jsonl line has no embedded \n / \r (one record per line)
  * jsonl field order is alphabetical (byte-stable archival)
  * parser rejects tampered payload via HashMismatch
  * parser rejects non-hex characters in hash
  * parser rejects missing field
  * hex encode/decode round-trip across empty / single byte / 0xff /
    UTF-8 / arbitrary bytes
  * hex decode rejects odd-length input
  * WitnessHash::from_hex round-trip
  * WitnessHash::from_hex rejects wrong length

44/44 cog tests green (34 → 44).

ADR-116 P4 row enumerates 4 sub-units now:  mDNS record-builder,
 witness chain primitive,  witness JSONL persistence,
 responder + embedded broker + Ed25519 signing.

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
v1223
2026-05-23 18:12:59 -04:00
ruv fe913b0ea7 cog-ha-matter (ADR-116 P4): pure witness hash-chain primitive
Second P4 unit: an append-only SHA-256 hash chain for tamper-evident
audit logging. ADR-116 §2.2 promised this for healthcare /
education / shared-housing deployments — this lands the primitive
with no key dependency so the next iter can layer Ed25519 signing
on top without touching the chain itself.

Module shape:

  * `WitnessHash([u8; 32])` newtype + `WitnessHash::GENESIS` sentinel
  * `WitnessEvent { seq, prev_hash, ts, kind, payload, this_hash }`
    — once committed, every field is immutable
  * `WitnessChain` — `append`, `tip`, `verify`, `events`
  * `canonical_bytes` — length-prefixed serialization that prevents
    the classic concatenation forgery
    (`abc|def` ≠ `ab|cdef`)
  * `WitnessVerifyError` — auditor-friendly error with `at: usize`
    on every variant (SeqGap, PrevHashMismatch, HashMismatch)

13 new tests covering both happy path and active tampering:

  * genesis hash all-zeros
  * empty chain tip is genesis
  * canonical bytes length-prefixed (anti-forgery)
  * canonical bytes start with prev_hash (wire-format lock)
  * append links to prev_hash
  * seq monotonic from 0
  * verify passes on clean chain
  * verify catches tampered payload (fires HashMismatch)
  * verify catches broken prev_hash link
  * verify catches seq gap
  * hash hex is 64 lowercase chars
  * first event prev_hash == GENESIS (auditor anchor)
  * different payloads → different hashes

Hash-chain over Merkle is the right tradeoff for the cog's event
rate (a few/min steady, dozens during a fall) — linear scan is
fine and we save the Merkle complexity for a future tier when
chains span days.

34/34 cog tests green (21 → 34).

ADR-116 P4 row updated to enumerate the three P4 sub-units shipped /
pending: (a) mDNS record-builder , (b) witness hash-chain , (c)
responder + embedded broker + Ed25519 signing pending.

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
v1224
2026-05-23 18:08:56 -04:00